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Instrumentation, Reduction of Risk, Risk Assessment, Protection, Detection System, Alarms and Operator Interventions, Detector, Gas Detecti

Is our industry addressing the problems facing it today? We idealize infinitesimally small event rates for highly catastrophic hazards, yet are we any safer? Have we solved the world’s problems? Layers of protection analysis (LOPA) drives hazardous event rates to 10-4 per year or less, yet industry is still experiencing several disastrous events per year. If one estimates 3,000 operating units worldwide and industry experiences approximately 3 major incidents per year, the tr

Kahneman has written about fast and unconscious thinking (a.k.a. system 1), versus conscious and slow thinking (a.k.a. system 2). We use...

This paper proposes a combined approach of discussing the cognitive psychology behind System 1 and System 2 thinking, the types of heuristic

Having a working knowledge of these five tools will improve a PHA‐LOPA facilitator’s awareness and ability to better evaluate human error re

Examples of the different types of graphic diagrams, methods in which the diagrams were utilized, and the benefits that each provided in th

To develop the Fire and Gas system requirements needed by industry, we first needed to understand the regulatory requirements, applicable in

Updated April 2026 - Written by aeSolutions Technical Team - There are many critical activities and decisions that take place prior to and during the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Verification and other Conceptual Design phases of projects conforming to ISA84 & ISA/IEC 61511. These activities and decisions introduce either opportunities to optimize, or obstacles that impede project flow, depending when and how these decisions are managed. Implementing Safety Instrumented Sys

Common sources of systematic failures and preventative or mitigative measures to prevent their occurrence are presented.

Bayes’ Theorem is sorely missing from the toolbox of Process Safety practitioners. This paper will introduce Bayes’ Theorem to the reader an

There are many devices (sensors, logic solvers and final elements) used in safety instrumented systems that are independently certified for use in safety applications to different safety integrity levels (SIL). There is considerable debate however whether fire and gas system hardware should have SIL ratings at all. Vendors are naturally interested in promoting independently certified hardware in order to differentiate their products. Considering the differences between safet

Functional safety engineers follow the ISA/IEC 61511 standard and perform calculations based on random hardware failures. These result in...

by aeSolutions Technical Team This paper will discuss how quantitative methods can be utilized to select the appropriate Safety Integrity Level associated with Burner Management Systems. Identifying the required amount of risk reduction is extremely important especially when evaluating existing legacy Burner Management Systems. Selection of an overly conservative Safety Integrity Level can have significant cost impacts. These costs will either be associated with increased Sa

This paper will discuss the issues, decisions, and challenges encountered when attempting to initially apply the concepts of the Safety Life

This paper discusses the identification, selection, implementation and management of Non-SIF IPLs through the process lifecycle.

Achieving Safety Integrity Level (SIL) targets can be difficult when proof test intervals approach turnaround intervals of five years or mor