The Mary Kay O’Connor Safety & Risk Conference offers attendees the opportunity to join more than 500 researchers and industry representatives from around the world to share the latest innovations and developments in process safety. Several representatives from the company will present at this year’s event and be available to meet at Booth # 12 . Links to the aeSolutions' whitepapers being presented will be added below as they are released. Day 1 - October 11th 10:00 AM Detection & Mitigation of Hydrogen Releases - Presented by Jesse Brumbaugh PE (TX) Topic: Hydrogen Safety Room: North Download Paper 11:30 AM Lunch - Exhibitors Presentation - aeSolutions - Presented by Chris Neff, PMP Day 3 - October 13th 9:30 AM Unrealized Potential of SRS - Presented by Greg Hardin, CFSE Topic: Security Room: South Find aeSolutions at Booth 12 The 2023 Conference will host: ⚬ 26th MKOPSC International Process Safety Symposium ⚬ 78th Instrumentation and Automation Symposium ⚬ 2nd Ocean Energy Safety Symposium More conference info can be found at https://mkosymposium.tamu.edu/

by Chris Neff, PMP In 2012, one of the steam boilers at the Wynnewood Refinery in Oklahoma exploded during a turnaround, resulting in the death of two workers. It was discovered that the boiler in question had a history of “hard starts.” As a result of this avoidable tragedy, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) cited Wynnewood Refining Company with multiple violations related to the Process Safety Management (PSM) standard under 29 CFR 1910.119. The incident at Wynnewood impacted the families of those harmed, the corporation’s reputation, and the bottom line. It also set a precedent for how facilities should implement PSM applicability, interconnectivity, and proximity for fired equipment. OSHA contended that the boiler was interconnected to a covered process throug h the refinery fuel gas system and steam header. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and ruled on behalf of OSHA that the boundary of a PSM process can extend beyond vessels and piping that contain hazardous chemicals. This ruling determined that utilities and fired equipment posing the risk of a catastrophic release, independent of their connection to hazardous materials, may be drawn into a site’s PSM covered processes. Many facilities rely on prescriptive applications, such as codes provided by the National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA), to manage fired equipment. While facilities have incorporated fired equipment, such as boilers, into their risk assessment process, the focus has historically been on the steam or process side of the equipment. Often the default for the Burner Management System (BMS) is the application of NFPA. Compliance with NFPA does not ensure compliance with OSHA PSM. In light of the Wynnewood ruling, PSM covered facilities must reevaluate their approach to fired equipment. Per NFPA 85*, utilizing the equivalency provision, an alternative design to meet the requirements of the code can be accomplished where all the following are provided: (1) Approval of the authority having jurisdiction. (2) A documented hazard analysis that addresses all the requirements of the code. (3) A documented life-cycle system safety analysis that addresses all requirements of the code and incorporates the appropriate application-based safety integrity level (SIL) for safety instrumented systems (SIS). The NFPA codes (85, 86, and 87 ) all reference ISA/IEC 61511 as a recognized methodol ogy for achieving equivalency. Likewise, OSHA also recognizes ISA/IEC 61511 as Recognized and Generally Acceptable Good Engineering Practice (RAGAGEP) for PSM covered processes. The Wynnewood ruling points to one distinct conclusion: PSM covered facilities should evaluate the applicability of their PSM and NFPA management systems for their fired equipment to determine if they are in conformance with OSHA’s declared expectations. * Reference Added to clarify equivalency: NFPA 85 Boiler and Combustion System Hazard Code 2019 Annex A, A4.11. Keywords: Process Analysis, Process Safety Management, Combustion, Boilers, Fire Alarm Interconnected Systems, Fired Equipment, Safety Instrumented Systems, ISA/IEC 61511 , NPFA 85, NFPA 86, NFPA 87, ISA 84, OSHA,

by Keith Brumbaugh Functional safety specialists may be stuck in the past and doing industry a disservice. The current industry trend is to only consider random hardware failures in safety integrity level probability of failure on demand calculations. But are random hardware failures the only thing that cause a safety instrumented function to fail? What if our assumptions are wrong? What if our installations do not match generic data or vendor assumptions? What else might we be missing? How might we address systematic (human) failures? Is anyone updating assumptions as operating experience is gained? One obvious problem with incorporating systematic failures is their non-random nature, hence the difficulty in including them in standard calculations. Many functional safety practitioners claim that systematic errors are addressed (i.e., minimized or eliminated) by following all the pr ocedures in the ISA/IEC 61511 standard . Yet even if the standard were strictly adhered to, could anyone realistically claim a 0% chance of a SIF failing due to a systematic issue? Some will say that systematic errors cannot be predicted, much less modeled. But is that true? Traditional PFD calculations are a useful starting point, but it is possible to incorporate systematic errors into a SIF’s real-world performance model. One can use Bayes’ theorem to capture data after a SIF has been installed — either through operating experience or incidents — and update the function’s predicted performance. This methodology can incorporate both objective and subjective observations. It can also be used to justify prior use of existing and non-certified equipment. To learn more about the use of Bayes’ theorem in SIF performance evaluations, read the full paper here. Other papers you may like: Reverend Bayes, meet Process Safety. Use Bayes’ Theorem to establish site specific confidence in your LOPA calculation Bayes’ Theorem is an epistemological statement of knowledge, versus a statement of proportions and relative frequencies. It is therefore a method that can bridge qualitative knowledge with the rare-event numbers that are intended to represent that knowledge. Bayes’ Theorem is sorely missing from the toolbox of Process Safety practitioners. This paper will introduce Bayes’ Theorem to the reader and discuss the reasons and applications for using Bayes in Process Safety related to IP Ls and LOPA . While intended to be introductory (to not discourage potential users), this paper will describe simple Excel™ based Bayesian calculations that the practitioner can begin to use immediately to address issues such as uncertainty, establishing confidence intervals, properly evaluating LOPA gaps, and incorporating site specific data, all related to IPLs and barriers used to meet LOPA targets. https://www.aesolutions.com/post/reverend-bayes-meet-process-safety-use-bayes-theorem-to-establish-site-specific-confidence-in-lopa

The ISA/IEC 61511 Safety Life Cycle starts with a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) and a Risk Assessment. What is a PHA? Why do we do it? =================================================== Excerpt taken from the webinar: Choosing a Risk Assessment Methodology In the full recording the ANSI/ISA 61511 Safety Life Cycle is shown to start with a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) and a Risk Assessment. This was the first webinar of our 3 part series and details the purpose of Risk Assessment and examines the advantages and limitations of various methodologies including Risk Graph, Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) , and others. See all our full recent webinars on https://www.aesolutions.com/webinars As a supplier of complete process safety and risk management solutions, we pride ourselves on providing engineers from industry with design, maintenance, operating, and process safety backgrounds. Our specialists understand how plants operate because they have actually worked in covered processes and facilities. Learn more-- https://www.aesolutions.com/process-s...

Process Safety Culture Improvement Blog 3 - by Judith Lesslie, CFSE, CSP, CCPSC This article continues a series of blogs around practical suggestions and methods to drive improvement of the process safety culture at manufacturing facilities. This is a big subject with many facets, and you can look forward to more bite-size potential improvement guidance for your own process safety culture in this series. The Challenges – A Process Safety Road Map In our last blog on strong process safety culture development, I described an organizational structure with a central committee and multiple process safety element committees, with the central committee driving the overall improvement cycle and each element committee interacting with the central committee to drive process safety performance while focusing on individual element performance and improvements. A supporting document for this structure is a process safety roadmap. A roadmap is a systematically written document outlining the process safety elements and systems that apply at your facility, potentially identifying gaps in documentation or system performance that should be improved. It could be a stand-alone document or an appendix to an existing process safety program document. What it needs to be is a living, controlled document that undergoes at least an annual review by SMEs in order to incorporate ongoing process safety enhancements and help establish new improvement goals. A sample roadmap for a portion of the Process Safety Information (PSI) element might look like this: A process safety roadmap of this type ideally includes all the applicable elements and supporting systems from the PSM and/or RMP standards. It can yield a number of benefits well beyond its obvious uses in self-verification and audit activities. It provides a structure for your process safety programs; it can be used in training and orientation activities for newly assigned professionals in technical, supervisory, and management roles; it helps to identify risks due to subpar documentation or compliance issues; it helps identify technical initiatives and goals for future resourcing; and it can even help prioritize improvement initiatives if you include your corporate risk ranking scores or another prioritization method with the potential gaps. Circling back to audit support, a roadmap also provides an easy method to identify that elusive documentation that is always needed before and during the recurring audits required under the PSM and RMP regulations. The development and easy availability of a process safety roadmap for your facility is likely to yield numerous improvement opportunities. An effective roadmap is an invaluable tool for site personnel and particularly to your staff involved in process safety element committees. This tool is also an excellent method of fostering more employee participation, which is undeniably one of the most important pillars of process safety. The Stakes The stakes for a strong process safety culture are higher than ever. A single significant loss of primary containment could have potential impacts ranging from serious on-site and off-site injuries and illnesses, to environmental damage, to company reputational impact, to financial costs from equipment damage, to production loss, and even lawsuits filed against the company. So Now What? Consider the development of a systematic process safety roadmap at your facility. Development and control of a document of this type has benefits well beyond the obvious uses in self-verification and audit activities. Adopting the roadmap structure exactly as shown may not be the best fit for your facility, but variations on it are within the reach of organizations of widely varying sizes and with or without a corporate governing structure. There is much to gain with a strong process safety culture and process safety performance with a roadmap! If you feel that your corporate or internal knowledge of the PSM and/or RMP regulations is not up to the job of developing a roadmap as described, including the identification of improvement opportunities, consider involving one of our expert process safety professionals in the work. aeSolutions staff members have wide experience of both regulations, including compliance methods found to be efficient in the real world at sites like yours. Future blogs in this series on process safety culture will address more aspects of the overall process safety improvement cycle, examine aspects of individual process safety programs, and offer suggestions on both bigger and smaller efforts and methods to drive improvements. Stay tuned for more!

Process Safety Culture Improvement Blog 1 - by Judith Lesslie, CFSE, CSP, CCPSC This article kicks off a series of blogs around practical suggestions and methods to drive improvement of the process safety culture at manufacturing facilities. This is a big subject with many facets, and there is plenty of professional reading available to help with it. I would point out, in particular, a fine work from the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety (Wiley, 2007, 1st edition). This book provides an excellent framework for establishing a systematic approach to process safety program elements. The Challenges – A Systematic Approach to a Strong and Effective Process Safety Culture What do I mean by a systematic approach? Let’s take a look at leadership commitment as an example. In a process safety culture that is systematically improving, senior facility management demonstrates a strong commitment to process safety by visibly prioritizing safety over production targets, allocating resources for process safety activities and initiatives, and actively participating in process safety programs and their improvement. How do you do that in the real world? There are many ways to tackle the topic, but let’s begin with a structured approach. In a strong process safety culture, there will typically be a routine management review process that; assesses the effectiveness of a variety of systems, including process safety programs, feeds improvement opportunities back into the applicable programs, executes improvements, and tests the changes on an ongoing basis: This process is demonstrated as follows: Figure 1: Routine management review process A process safety management cycle of this type takes a close look at process safety trends: near misses and incidents, together with the investigations and completion of actions; assessment of regulatory compliance, including audit results, findings, and follow-up actions; effectiveness of the facility risk management processes, including PHAs, the health of critical safeguard systems, and follow-up actions the health of mechanical integrity at the site; and the adequacy of safety policies and regulations, together with checking on the health of the safety training system; among other potential topics Preparing for and completing a review of this type is likely to yield a numerous corrective actions and continuous improvement opportunities. If this sounds to you a bit like a Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) approach, you are right on target.  Think of the overall systematic approach to effective leadership of process safety and culture as a number of individual program continuous improvement processes running within the larger structure of an overall leadership improvement cycle. The Stakes The stakes for a strong process safety culture are higher than ever.  A single significant loss of primary containment could have potential impacts ranging from serious on-site and off-site injuries and illnesses, to environmental damage, to company reputational impact, to financial costs from equipment damage, to production loss, and even lawsuits filed against the company. So Now What? The upcoming series of blogs on process safety culture will address more aspects of the overall process safety improvement cycle, examine aspects of individual process safety programs, and offer suggestions on both bigger and smaller efforts and methods to drive improvements.  Click here for Part 2: Structuring Your Process Safety Programs

Process Safety Culture Improvement Blog 2 - by Judith Lesslie, CFSE, CSP, CCPSC This article continues a series of blogs around practical suggestions and methods to drive improvement of the process safety culture at manufacturing facilities.  This is a big subject with many facets, and you can look forward to more bite-size potential improvement guidance for your own process safety culture. The Challenges – What is Process Safety Structure and Why Does It Matter? What do I mean by a process safety structure?  I cannot do much better than build on the concept described in a fine work from the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety (Wiley, 2007, 1st edition).  This book provides an excellent visualization of process safety program elements: Graphic from https://www.aiche.org/ccps/resources/publications/process-safety-summaries In this structure, there is a foundation of leadership underpinned by foundational blocks of commitment to process safety, understanding and management of process risks, and a learning and improvement cycle driving continuous improvement for all pillars. Each foundational block includes the pillars that support the overall structure, including all of the PSM and RMP elements that we are familiar with and some supporting elements to help keep those main elements on track. In a high-performing process safety culture, subject matter experts (SMEs) are available for each element or pillar.  In the best facility organizations I have seen, each SME chairs one or more element committees assigned to monitor and drive improvements in element performance. A central committee composed of facility leadership and the SMEs regularly monitors and helps encourage progress by each pillar committee.  Sometimes that central committee monitors a broader range of health, safety, and environmental aspects than the process safety pillars depicted above, which is a model that I have also seen work well.  Here is a way to visualize one potential central and element committee structure, with the central committee driving the overall improvement cycle and each element committee focusing on and interacting with the central committee: In this type of systematic structure, there is an expectation that the element committees will have a set of meaningful leading and lagging measures that will be monitored and trended on a routine basis (monthly to quarterly) and used as a basis for driving continuous improvement planning.  Pillar metrics, planning, and resource needs are routinely reported to the central committee, and there is a further expectation that improvement planning will be reviewed, agreed and resourced as needed by the central committee.  You can think about this as a continuous two-way feedback cycle.  The assignment of a senior leadership team member as day-to-day liaison with each element committee is another enhancement I have seen work well to deliver results. Worthy of special notice, in a strong process safety culture, there will typically be an annual management review process that assesses the overall effectiveness of process safety. This process feeds improvement opportunities back into the applicable pillar committees for testing against line perspectives, executing improvements, and monitoring and assessing results.  This is easily visualized as the Review step of the central committee. Does this sound like a lot of work?  You’re absolutely right!  Will it improve your process safety culture and deliver strong performance results?  Right again!  There are other benefits as well.  As the central committee and SMEs recruit and develop enhanced process safety capability in facility personnel (including line personnel) participating in committees, you gain organizational competency; you are able to demonstrate strong employee participation, one of the key elements of process safety; and you provide a channel for line personnel to demonstrate leadership and technical qualities that might not otherwise be apparent.  There is a lot to gain by structuring your process safety programs as described. The Stakes The stakes for a strong process safety culture are higher than ever.  A single significant loss of primary containment could have potential impacts ranging from serious on-site and off-site injuries and illnesses, to environmental damage, to company reputational impact, to financial costs from equipment damage, to production loss, and even lawsuits filed against the company. So Now What? Consider reviewing this structure with your facility’s senior and extended leadership team.  Adopting the structure exactly as described may not be the best fit for your facility, but variations of it are within the reach of organizations of varying sizes.  There is much to gain in process safety performance with wide personnel involvement in improvement activities! Future blogs in this series on process safety culture will address more aspects of the overall process safety improvement cycle, examine aspects of individual process safety programs, and offer suggestions on both bigger and smaller efforts and methods to drive improvements.  Stay tuned for more!

A Functional Safety Assessment (FSA) is defined by the IEC 61511 standard as an “investigation, based on evidence, to judge the functional safety achieved by one or more SIS and/or other protection layers.” The ultimate goal of an FSA is to make the team confident that their instrumented safety system will reliably achieve the risk reduction needed. While many organizations understand the importance of FSAs, not everyone realizes the significant advantages of conducting one, especially when initiated earlier in the design process. Starting the assessment early allows for more thorough safety considerations and ensures safety measures are ingrained in the project from the beginning. Why Do You Conduct Functional Safety Assessments? The primary motivation is to ensure the Safety Instrumented Functions being implemented actually address the hazards for which they are designed. It might seem routine, but a Functional Safety Assessment is not just a box to check in your development process; it's a powerful tool that can enhance your organization’s safety, compliance, and cost-efficiency. The benefits include: Safety Assurance The primary and most critical reason for conducting FSAs is to ensure the safety of people, property, and the environment. By identifying and addressing potential hazards, we can prevent accidents and reduce the impact of failures. Standard and Regulatory Compliance: Conducting FSAs helps organizations comply with these regulations, reducing the risk of legal and financial repercussions. Cost Reduction: While implementing safety measures can require an initial investment, it often leads to long-term cost savings. Preventing accidents and failures can significantly reduce downtime, repair costs, and potential liability claims. Innovation and Competitive Advantage: Functional safety assessments can drive innovation by pushing engineers and developers to create more robust and reliable systems. FSA Stages The standard requires 5 stages of FSAs to be performed over the lifetime of a SIS at key phases of the project lifecycle. Stage 1 – After the Hazard and Risk Assessment has been carried out, the required protection layers have been identified, and the SRS has been developed Stage 2 – After the SIS has been designed (typically after Factory Acceptance Testing) Stage 3 – After the installation, pre-commissioning, and final validation of the SIS have been completed, and operation and maintenance procedures have been developed (typically during the Pre-Startup Safety Review) Stage 4 – After gaining experience with the operation and maintenance of the system Stage 5 – After modification and prior to decommissioning of a SIS These stages are sequentially depicted in Figure 7 from ANSI/ISA-61511-1-2018 - Safety Lifecycle Phases and FSA Stages: https://blog.isa.org/hs-fs/hubfs/Imported_Blog_Media/ANSI-ISA-84_00_0-1-2004-IES-61511-Mod-Safety-Life-Cycle.jpg A typical Stage 1 FSA compares the content of the SRS to the hazardous scenario outlined in the risk assessment. For example, Stage 1 will review whether the IPLs are truly independent, whether the SIF will protect against the stated hazard, etc. A Stage 2 will be completed after the detailed engineering is complete and will review the detailed design against the SRS. Identifying and rectifying safety issues at the initial stages of development is significantly more cost-effective than addressing them later in the process or, worse, post-construction. In summary, it’s most cost effective to assess the design while it is still on paper. Late-stage changes can be expensive, lead to project delays, and sometimes even necessitate a complete redesign. In addition to the practical benefits, by addressing safety concerns from the outset, you foster a proactive approach to safety that can be carried forward into future projects, enhancing overall safety awareness and practices. An FSA Stage 3 is done after installation, commissioning, and validation is complete, typically during the Pre-Startup Safety Review. Conducting a Stage 3 reviews work done during the installation and pre-commissioning phases. The Stage 3 FSA ensures the installed system matched the design package. There is now a greater emphasis on FSAs in the standard than previously. IEC 61511 formerly only required the FSA Stage 3 before the introduction of hazards to the process. With the latest version of the standard, FSA Stages 1, 2, and 3 are now required. If the project has advanced beyond the design phase, Stage 1 and 2 can be done congruently along with the Stage 3. By performing FSAs early in your project's lifecycle, you reduce risks and demonstrate your commitment to safety and quality. While these stages of FSAs are a requirement of the 61511 standard, they deliver significant value beyond standard compliance as they provide meaningful advancements towards protecting people and assets. Related: How About a Stage Zero Functional Safety Assessment (FSA)? Don’t Dismiss Stage 4 of an SIS Functional Safety Assessment!

Deadlines met through concurrent engineering and procurement while maintaining adherence to the Safety Lifecycle by Chris Hickling, PMP Implementing Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) and Burner Management Systems (BMS) within tight deadlines and supply chain disruptions has become a challenge in the industrial space. A recent project implementing a Safety Instrumented BMS met strict safety standards despite tight deadlines and supply chain delays. The initial goal of the project was focused on converting the boiler fuel from coal to natural gas with a BMS provided by the boiler equipment supplier.  While the project was underway, requirements to apply risk and performance-based Process Safety Management (PSM) protocols were added to the project.  The client approached aeSolutions for application of the PSM protocol employing the equivalency clauses provided in the NFPA code for the BMS. This change required a strategic shift incorporating a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) and Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), and Safety Instrumented Burner Management System (SI-BMS) implementation. Integrated planning with our client and the boiler equipment supplier was key to achieving the fast-track schedule, including concurrent engineering and early procurement of long-lead system components. PSM, SIS, and BMS experts addressed the safety and code requirements of the design, working together with systems engineering and panel design experts. The multi-discipline team efficiently produced the deliverable, aligning with the project's enhanced safety within the original project timeline. The Challenges The new additional project objective was to implement an SI-BMS using a Siemens PCS 7 Platform, meeting all the Safety Lifecycle requirements within a highly compressed schedule. Traditionally, the project would unfold sequentially, starting with a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) followed by a Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA), then continue with SIS Front End Loading (FEL), conducting Demand Rate Verification (DVR) SIL calculations, and completing the Safety Requirements Specification before moving on to Detailed Design. However, given the schedule constraints, a new strategy was required.   The strategy employed concurrent development of the PHA/LOPA, SIS deliverables, and early identification and procurement of long-lead items to achieve the existing deadlines of the project.   Additionally, early detailed planning and expedited deliveries were necessary to ensure that BMS was built and commissioned during the scheduled plant outage. Having all of the requisite expertise for each of the project analysis, engineering, procurement, fabrication, and commissioning steps within aeSolutions was critical to this fast track approach. Results A key takeaway from this project was the development of an integrated schedule to manage all activities effectively, significantly reducing the risk of late changes. Close collaboration between the client, the boiler equipment supplier, and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in SIS and BMS was necessary to maintain a fast-tracked schedule while meeting all the Safety Lifecycle requirements. This unified approach created a rapid turnaround on approvals for drawings and fabrication of the system for the project's tight timeline.  By employing a firm with the needed expertise in all these areas, delays due to processing and learning curves as well as the risk of rework associated with handoffs were avoided. The ability to assemble the appropriate SME expertise at the earliest stage of discovery while managing collaboration with the boiler equipment supplier and the client-enabled fast approval processes. Effective planning and all stakeholder’s cooperation were key to achieving all the project objectives.  The strategies and insights gained from overcoming these challenges offered valuable lessons for future similar projects.

At aeSolutions, our commitment to charitable and volunteer work is a reflection of our core values, which are centered on being results-driven, inclusive, and relentless. We are dedicated to making a positive impact on the communities in which we operate, beyond our mission of creating safer communities through our engineering work. One of the ways we give back is through charitable organizations that align with these core values and our mission, where our team members engage in volunteer work. As part of our 25th anniversary celebration, we’re proud to spotlight the following examples: aeSolutions Goes Back to School Each February aeSolutions celebrates Engineers Week, a time to celebrate and say thank you to the engineers making a difference in the world. This is also a time to increase public dialogue about the need for engineers. Jack Boone, Chris Powell, and Brittany Lampson recently helped students in local schools make paper airplanes as they explained the importance of engineering as a career as part of Engineers Week. FIRST ROBOTICS Erich Zende leads a FIRST robotics team that aeSolutions has sponsored for several years. The team, FRC Flash 1319, is made up of students from several different Greenville County high schools. Almost all of the students have pursued higher education, often in STEM-related fields. Erich supports the students in the mechanical and electrical prototyping, design, and fabrication phases of their projects. He also transports the team’s robot and pit setup to and from events. FIRST Robotics is an international organization dedicated to transforming the culture to inspire students to be leaders in science and technology. FIRST was founded in 1989 to inspire young people's interest and participation in science and technology. For more info about the team, links to the robotics team’s website and social media sites can be found below: FIRST Robotics Team Flash 1319 (frcflash1319.wixsite.com) FRC Flash 1319 | Facebook Flash 1319 (@FRCFlash1319) / Twitter FRC Flash 1319 (@frcflash1319) • Instagram photos and videos (1082) FRC Flash 1319 - YouTube Meals on Wheels Twenty aeSolutions employees from the Greenville, SC office volunteer to help deliver meal to local people who are homebound. Each week, two aeSolutions volunteers deliver Meals on Wheels during their lunch. aeSolutions is a corporate partner with Meals on Wheels, and we have been helping deliver meals since 2011. It is more than daily nourishment; it is also delivering friendship to those who spend a lot of time alone. More info: Meals On Wheels Greenville, SC Photo: Steve Morrison delivers a meal. Other charity involvement: Leukemia and Lymphoma Society, Special Olympics, Back to School supply Drives, St. Anthony of Padua School – Gala sponsor, Food drives, Blood drives aeSolutions also sponsors and participates in United Way’s Hands on Greenville, the Upstate’s largest annual day of service. Last year, 2,100 community volunteers rolled up their sleeves to serve across Greenville County — an estimated economic impact of $250,000. aeSolutions employees volunteering at Hands on Greenville

aeSolutions agrees with the findings of the Construction Industry Institute (CII). The CII has done extensive research on improving project success. Through quantitative analysis of 62 projects, as noted in Analysis of Pre-Project Planning Effort and Success Variables for Capital Facility Projects, they found that the front end loading (FEL) “effort level directly affects the cost and schedule predictability of the project.” The CII described a staged approach to projects, where engineering is divided into two phases; front end loading and detailed design. The CII documented that front end loading of capital facilities “is an extremely important function in determining the ultimate outcome of a project.” They found that as the level of front end loading tasks increases the: Project cost performance from authorization decreases by as much as 20%, Variance between project schedule performance versus authorization decreases by as much as 39%, Plant design capacity attained and facility utilization improved by as much as 15%, Project scope changes after authorization tend to decrease Likelihood that a project met or exceeded its financial goals increased The CII defines a front end loading package for a capital facility as “the process of developing sufficient strategic information for owners to address risk and decide to commit resources to maximize the chance for a successful project.” They concluded that the “design work hours to be completed prior to project authorization should be from 10% to 25% of the total design effort depending upon the complexity of the project.” aeSolutions fully endorses the development of a front end loading package for all safety instrumented system projects. aeSolutions defines the following tasks as being part of a typical Safety Instrumented System Front End Loading (SIS FEL): Hazard identification Conduct HAZOP Risk assessment Perform LOPA Develop SIF list Develop SIS design basis support report Safety requirements specification (SRS) Develop lifecycle cost analysis Develop interlock / safety instrumented function list Develop sequence of operations Conceptual design specification Redline P&ID’s Develop system architecture diagram Develop E-stop philosophy Develop testing philosophy Develop UPS philosophy Develop bypassing philosophy Develop wiring philosophy Develop SIS logic solver specification – Bill of materials (BOM) Develop approved instrument vendor list / Procure plan for SIS Develop SIL verification report Develop control panel location sketch Develop control philosophy specification Summary safety report Construction estimate, total installed cost (+- 20%) When total lifecycle costs were compared for two design options on a large Burner Management System (BMS) program, it was determined that significant savings can be achieved for a 1oo1 sensor architecture (versus 2oo3), regardless of which cost basis was used for a nuisance trip. aeSolutions stands behind the concept of SIS FEL and believes the project contained within this case study on front end loading is a good example of the benefits and overall success of a phased/gated approach to project execution. Click here for the full story and case study. #burnermanagementsystems #frontendloadingonaBurnerManagementSystemproject #safetyinstrumentedsystems #FrontEndLoading

The process industry uses Layer Of Protection Analysis (LOPA) to document extremely small probabilities for catastrophic events. Predictions of 10-5/yr or less are common. The intent is to show that a facility is “safe." Yet, are such low numbers achievable in the real world? How does one prove that you are meeting them? The frequentist approach the method is based upon requires enormous amounts of data to state such a value definitively. A facility will not have, nor will it ever want, enormous amounts of data for rare catastrophic events. Such low targets are impossible to achieve when one considers the real-world uncertainties of physical systems and factors such as systematic errors. Considering that industry still experiences several disastrous events per year, the current methodology would appear to have a flaw. In fact, we would seem to be off target by up to three orders of magnitude. We are drowning in data, yet the real problems appear lost in the chaos. When everything appears to be a problem, nothing will be managed effectively. If one could successfully identify actual problems, then effective management could occur. Yet, how might one decipher the data and visualize the impact of potential shortcomings? One way could be with a periodic health check of the various independent protection layers (IPLs). According to the latest version of ISA/IEC 61511, functional safety assessments after a period of operation are now required to do exactly this. Bayes' rule could then be used to provide a means to visualize the findings using a protection layer called a “health meter.” The Bayesian approach starts with the optimistic rare event assumptions. This initial probability distribution is known as the “prior." The approach combines that with real-world observations, updating the model over time with new evidence to form a “posterior." The Bayesian approach allows all relevant evidence to be factored into the model, including subjective data. This approach allows one to base plant health metrics on observed evidence. Such an approach will likely show a facility isn’t as good as it hoped it was. When Bayes shows that 10-6/yr can’t be met, a facility must step back and ask, “What are we really trying to achieve?” Every facility needs to focus on the systems that need the most help. The Bayesian approach can show how each individual protection layer is behaving. Advanced warnings could then be given based on evidence. All this aims to discover systematic errors, allowing management to focus on fixing bad actors. To read the full paper and learn more about the “Bayes Truth Meter”, click here. Facility Siting CHAZOP