by Keith Brumbaugh Is our industry stuck in the past? The current industry trend is to only look at random hardware failures in safety integrity level (SIL) probability of failure on demand (PFD) ca lculations. No one would appear to be updating assumptions as operating experience is gained. Hardware failure rates are generally fixed in time, assumed to be average point values (rather than distributions), and either generic in nature or specific to a certain set of hardware and/or conditions which the vendors determine by suitable tests or failure mode analysis. But are random hardware failures the only thing that cause a safety instrumented function (SIF) to fail? What if our assumptions are wrong? What if our installations do not match vendor assumptions? What else might we be missing? How are we addressing systematic failures? One obvious problem with incorporating systematic failures is their non-random nature. Many functional safety practitioners claim that systematic errors are addressed (i.e., minimized or eliminated) by following all the pro cedures in the ISA/IEC 61511 standard. Y et even if the standard were strictly adhered to, could anyone realistically claim a 0% chance of a SIF failing due to a human factor? Some will say that systematic errors cannot be predicted, much less modeled. But is that true? This paper will examine factors which tend to be ignored when performing hardware-based reliability calculations. Traditional PFD calculations are merely a starting point. This paper will examine how to incorporate systematic errors into a SIF’s real-world model. It will cover how to use Bayes theorem to capture data after a SIF has been installed — either through operating experience or industry incidents — and update the function’s predicted performance. This methodology can also be used to justify prior use of existing and non-certified equipment. Click here to view the complete whitepaper

ABSTRACT A systematic database approach can be used to design, develop and test a Safety Instrumented System This paper will demonstrate that through a database approach, the design deliverables and system configuration Topics Include: ANSI/ISA S84.01 , Safety Instrumented Systems , Safety Instrumented Functions , Safety

This assessment tool determines conceptual compliance of a facility’s Burner Management System (BMS) It highlights important findings for a facility’s fired equipment system.

performance criteria for achieving design objectives, fuel train, field devices, logic solver platform, control , startup sequences & shutdown interlocks logic, Human Machine Interface (HMI) displays, Combustion Control System (CCS) interaction, training, operation and maintenance procedures. solver platform certified to IEC 61508 for SIL 2 or greater and approved by the client for the BMS control Implement seamless CCS interaction and required control for proper functioning of the startup sequences

Commission (IEC) published Edition 2 of the IEC 61511 standard, “Functional Safety – Safety Instrumented Systems This standard covers the design and management requirements for a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) throughout

Implementing Safety Instrumented System (SIS) projects that support the long‐term viability of the Process here to view the complete whitepaper Topics Include: IEC 61511, ISA/IEC 61511 , Safety Instrumented Systems

We established two new business lines – Plant Protection Systems and Migrations and Upgrades – that will Migrations and Upgrades A new Migrations and Upgrades business was established. from small to large industrial installations, the solution is based on industry standard safety and control their risk management and operational excellence goals through expertise in process safety, combustion control and safeguarding, safety instrumented systems, control system design and integration, alarm management

aeSolutions recognized an industry need for Fire and Gas panels based on a SIL capable PLC safety control Large industrial clients were looking for a system capable of monitoring and controlling Fire system 1/0, combustible gas, toxic gas, and oxygen depletion detectors, initiating suppression release, controlling To develop the Fire and Gas system requirements needed by industry, we first needed to understand the This code requires the use of NFPA 72 for fire alarm signaling systems.

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I am consistently asked what my favorite and least favorite control systems are to work on. from system to system. Ideally, a control system would be “ air-gapped ” in order to minimize the possibility of introducing Upon entering the control room, my colleague and I were greeted by what is inarguably the nicest control systems.

This is the theory of System 1 (i.e., Fast) versus System 2 (i.e., Slow) thinking that explains we are really two people: Our conscious aware selves (System 2 thinking), and a dominant “fast” subconscious making most of our decisions (System 1 thinking) without being consciously aware of it in the moment This paper proposes a combined approach of discussing the cognitive psychology behind System 1 and System will incorporate the learnings from 5 years of safety critical Task Analysis performed for field and control

Looking at actual accidents caused by control and safety system failures shows that accidents are not It’s up to management to control these factors.