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  • HIPPS Justification - High Integrity Pressure Protection System

    What’s a HIPPS and where are they used? Updated April 2026 - There are two common applications for a High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS) . First, many process facilities have expanded to the point where the original pressure relieving and flare system may no longer be able to handle a potential event. Preventing a potential overpressure through the use of a HIPPS can be done at a much lower cost compared to installing a new flare and header system. Second, many subsea and land based pipelines are not designed to withstand full wellhead pressure. So a HIPPS measures pressure (usually using redundant transmitters), utilizes a logic solver (many technologies and configurations are acceptable), and closes valves. While such designs are allowed per current codes, the justification of such a system requires careful analysis by a team of specialists. The justification and analysis of a HIPPS must consider all operating and upset conditions that might cause an overpressure. Process dynamics must be analyzed to determine if the HIPPS can respond quickly enough to prevent the hazard. Some cases may be quite complex with multiple scenarios and multiple HIPPS. Without an adequately sized conventional relief system, the HIPPS represents the last line of defense against an overpressure event. Subsequently, many end users require an independent, third party review of the justification of such a system. How good is good enough? A HIPPS should offer performance as good or better than the conventional relief system it may be replacing. The performance of relief valves in the process industries varies considerably depending upon the application. Published sources of data show that relief valves in some applications offer performance no better than the equivalent of Safety Integrity Level 1 (SIL 1). Considering the uncertainty of the data, many specify that HIPPS meet SIL 3 performance. This requires the use of fault tolerant sensors a nd valves. The use of a SIL 2 system is still a possibility, with significantly lower capital and operational costs. Questions to ask yourself Do you have a case where the existing relieving system is unable to adequately handle the load, and has this been documented in a thorough hazards analysis? Is the vessel in air, water or steam service? (If yes, the use of a HIPPS is not permissible.) Is approval of local authorities required? Do you have a case where a pipeline is not rated for the full wellhead pressure? Have you performed a SIL selection study to determine the level of performance that will be required by the HIPPS? aeSolutions is here to help aeSolutions can help you determine whether a HIPPS is a viable option for your application. If justified, we can work with you to develop the requirements specification and deliver a system that will meet your specific safety and cybersecurity needs. #HIPPS Click here for more information on aeSolutions' pressure relief study services

  • 5 Steps for an Effective Fire & Gas System Philosophy

    By Chris Hickling Updated April 2026 - A Fire & Gas System (FGS) philosophy provides a solid foundation for the design of an effective gas detection system, which in turn helps protect plant and personnel from gas releases and resulting flammable and/or toxic effects. An FGS philosophy for a process facility that is not fit for purpose or does not have a firm auditable basis can increase the likelihood of undetected leaks incurring risk to personnel or unnecessary expenses for the company. Under-engineering a gas detection system has safety implications, while over-engineering has commercial implications such as increasing capital and maintenance costs without significantly reducing risk. The workflow for an FGS philosophy can be summarized in the following steps: Assess FGS requirements – review regulatory requirements, corporate standards, pertinent Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) recommendations, and Recognized And Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) Develop FGS philosophy and procedures – review materials and properties (flammable, toxic, or inert), process flow, and risk tolerance criteria Define FGS scenarios and zones – determine hazards using data for process conditions, weather, occupancy, and airflow data, and drawings such as plot plans, Piping & Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs), and Cause & Effects (C&Es) Define zone FGS performance requirements – Develop criteria to assess facility layout and define areas Develop criteria for FGS detector placement What makes an effective FGS philosophy? Firstly, it's important to establish the scope of the FGS system. Is it intended to protect on-site personnel and equipment, offsite community, and/or environment? A comprehensive review of the entire facility is essential – if individual process units at the facility are exclusively analyzed for gas detection, it could result in a fractured response and unforeseen effects at other units. A gas cloud doesn't care where it's released or where it's going, and it doesn't respect boundaries. Secondly, the FGS philosophy should follow applicable codes like NFPA 72 and be applied consistently across the facility. Issues could arise if different areas of the plant use different gas detection technologies or alarm levels; for example, if one unit of the plant alarms at 10% of the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) and another unit alarms at 20% LEL, or there are inconsistent color of warning strobes for a toxic gas release. Consistency in gas detection, alarms, and encompassing standardized procedure(s) helps the operators and employees respond efficiently. Additionally, the FGS philosophy should lay down the criteria for decisions on gas detection required and appropriate mitigative response such as alarm levels (e.g., alarm at 10% LEL). The FGS philosophy also helps decide the voting criteria for the number of gas detectors to take action. For example, two out of two (2oo2) gas detectors may be required to alarm before starting the sprinkler system or dumping Halon. Finally, an FGS philosophy should be auditable. During its development, assumptions are made which feed into how the gas release is modeled and location of gas detectors. If a bad assumption is made and a leak later occurs, it is essential to be able to revisit the original FGS philosophy and assess the original basis for the design. If the gas detection system has a performance-based design, the layout of the system is documented so that it can be reviewed and adjusted. Traditional rules of thumb gas detector placement do not offer this ability to review and update the basis. Once these practices are incorporated into a facility's FGS philosophy, a comprehensive and well-documented FGS philosophy provides a solid foundation for the design of an effective and auditable gas detection system. Facilities can have a dependable basis to ensure an appropriate number of gas detectors in the appropriate locations, potentially lowering risk and minimizing costs for the gas detection system. Click here for more information on aeSolutions' SOP Training and Development services

  • What is a Dust Hazard Analysis (DHA)? | Pt. 5

    Understanding a Dust Hazard Analysis (DHA) Updated April 2026 - Following on from the first four aeSolutions blogs on the subject of combustible dust concerns , this blog provides another deep dive into the topic. We previously addressed the basic concerns around combustible dusts, many of the standards that address dust hazard guidance , and the properties and testing for combustible dusts ; potential ignition sources ; and potential safeguards . This article will build on those topics to pull it all together and review a commonly used dust hazard analysis (DHA) method. The Challenges | Dust Hazard Analysis (DHA) A Dust Hazard Analysis or DHA is an important method to assess the risk posed by ignition of combustible dusts. Companies handling highly hazardous chemicals (HHC) routinely conduct process hazard analyses (PHAs), but it is not common to encounter PHAs that thoroughly review combustible dust hazards or company internal standards that address combustible dust hazards. Many companies’ PHAs do not address combustible dust hazards in an organized manner or in a manner that complies with industry guidance on dust hazard analyses (DHA), if the dust hazards are reviewed at all. Why Would You Conduct a Dust Hazard Analysis For a Combustible Dust Process? There are several reasons, and the most obvious is to protect people, the environment, assets, and reputation from dust explosions and fires. Other reasons for a Dust Hazard Analysis (DHA) include: The OSHA general duty clause requires that, in addition to compliance with hazard-specific standards, all employers provide a work environment " …free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm. " A company may identify the need for a Dust Hazard Analysis on an existing combustible dust process internally due to this requirement. A dust explosion incident involving a dust with identical or similar properties to that in an existing process may occur. An industrial hygiene review of process dust or particulates may identify combustibility concerns. A PHA team may identify the need for a deeper dive into dust risks. A codes and standards review may identify NFPA 652 (Standard on the Fundamentals of Combustible Dust) as a needful standard for compliance. NFPA 652 is considered to be a Recognized And Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice ( RAGAGEP ). An insurance company providing coverage for the facility may request it. How to Conduct a Risk-Based Dust Hazard Analysis A Dust Hazard Analysis is a focused method to improve facility safety by identifying combustible dust hazards and necessary safeguards associated with a process. There are variations across companies on how DHAs are conducted, similar to the many variations on PHAs that can be found in industry, but there are two basic approaches: a traditional approach based on an engineering analysis and standards compliance; and a risk based approach. Most companies opt for a risk-based approach and those basic steps are described here: Identify the relevant properties of a combustible dust (as described in part 2 of this series). Form a suitable team to perform the Dust Hazard Analysis, including a qualified facilitator. Determine which internal and industry standards apply to the Dust Hazard Analysis and educate team members on those standards. (There is a partial list of applicable industry standards in part 1 of this series.) Assemble or develop the process safety information that the Dust Hazard Analysis team will need, including equipment ratings, electrical area classification designations, dust data, safe operating ranges, operating procedures, housekeeping protocols, and current maintenance regimes, among other data. If there are existing mitigating safeguards (as described in part 4 of our Dust Hazard Analysis series ), data on those systems should also be readily available. With guidance from a qualified facilitator, the team develops the credible dust cloud and dust layer scenarios internal and external to the equipment. The team identifies the credible internal and external ignition sources for each scenario (as described in part 3 of our Dust Hazard Analysis series ). The team then assumes that an ignition occurs in each scenario and assesses and describes the potential unmitigated safety and environmental (and sometimes commercial and reputational) consequences. Guidance from a qualified facilitator is crucial at this step. The team then assesses the likelihood of occurrence of the credible ignition sources. Guidance from a qualified Dust Hazard Analysis facilitator is also crucial at this step. Risk ranking results and acceptance criteria vary from company to company, but typically the team then uses the consequence and likelihood to develop an unmitigated risk rank for each scenario. The team then assesses existing preventive and mitigating safeguards for each scenario, using those factors to determine the existing mitigated risk rank for each. When the mitigated risk ranking does not meet the risk criteria set by the company, then the team typically develops recommendations for additional engineering and/or administrative safeguards. The team may also need to issue recommendations to ensure that safeguards have sufficient specificity, independence, dependability, and auditability, similar to Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) independent protection layers , if that is a company expectation. Finally, the facility follows up on the Dust Hazard Analysis (DHA) recommendations. If this process sounds a great deal like a HAZOP study to you, then you are right on target. It is also a common practice for companies to adapt their LOPA methods to be suitable for Dust Hazard Analyses for the higher consequence scenarios. It is generally a feasible task to adapt or develop HAZOP and LOPA software templates to be suitable for DHAs. It can even be done in spreadsheets or word processing documents in case of need, though this type of documentation is a little more difficult to initially develop. An excellent reference for those who wish a deeper dive into DHA methods is Guidelines for Combustible Dust Hazard Analysis , 1st Edition, 2017, by Center for Chemical Process Safety, published by Wiley-AIChE available on-line from your favorite technical bookseller. The Risk of Dust Hazards Do you handle potentially combustible dusts at your site? It is difficult to adequately control a hazard that is not well-understood. Even if you have a good-quality PHA, it may not delve deeply enough into the combustible dust topic in accordance with NFPA 652. NFPA 652 states that existing processes and compartments (e.g., building compartments) shall have a completed DHA by September 7, 2020 (¶ 7.1.1.2) and that the Dust Hazard Analysis shall be reviewed and updated at least every five years (¶ 7.1.4). Are you in compliance? Are you positive your site is managing its combustible dust risks in all phases of operation well enough to prevent a serious explosion? The Takeaway - Dust Hazard Analysis (DHA) If you have not previously taken a deep dive into the combustibility properties of your particular dust(s) and completed a Dust Hazard Analysis at your site, now would be a good time to do so. If you do not have the right expertise in your staff to assess dust hazards, consider engaging a process safety consultancy with deep experience and expertise to assist you. Their range of experience enables assessors to share the general and specific methods proven to minimize dust explosion hazards across industry. This independence from the site and company has the best probability of a careful analysis with fresh eyes on the relevant critical systems and leads to more efficient compliance with the necessary standards. Written by Judith Lesslie, CFSE, CSP AIChE Webinar: Combustible Dusts and Dust Hazard Analysis: Assess Your Risk presented by Judith Lesslie - Senior Principal Specialist - aeSolutions

  • PSM and RMP Audit Themes Across Industry Part 1

    by Judith Lesslie, CFSE, CSP Updated April 2026 - Those who work in high hazard industries are familiar with the OSHA Process Safety Management ( PSM ) and EPA Risk Management Plan (RMP) requirements for routine audits to assess and verify compliance with these regulations. In a prior blog, we reviewed different strategies for accomplishing these audits. In this blog, we will cover specific types of concerns that have been identified at many manufacturing sites. The Challenges Companies conduct audits in order to assess the effectiveness of their process safety systems, with the primary goal of ensuring their covered processes are managed in a way that minimizes the risk of process safety incidents. In a review across many manufacturing segments, company, and site PSM and RMP audits, it has been found that the same types of concerns are present at many locations. These areas of concern occur across the entire range of PSM and RMP elements. In Part 1 we discuss PSM/RMP applicability, Employee Participation, Incident Investigation, Contractor Management and Hot Work, Emergency Response and Audits: In the area of PSM and RMP applicability , it is important for sites to assess and document their inventories of highly hazardous chemicals (HHC), keeping in mind that the PSM and RMP HHC lists are not identical. In a related vein, failure to analyze HHC inventories near occupied buildings and failure to completely assess interconnectivity of potentially covered process equipment can be serious concerns. Employee Participation is an important element of compliance. While most sites have a reasonable level of employee participation in their process safety programs, that participation is often not described in a procedure or road map. This represents a missed opportunity to document participation and to educate site personnel on their opportunities to get involved in process safety activities. Sites often have a one-size-fits-all Incident Investigation method, which may be either too simple or too complex for some incidents; this leads to the potential for missed root causes that need to be addressed or to spending too much time and effort on less severe incidents. Allowing for a range of investigation methods depending on the actual and potential severity of an incident is an excellent practice to consider. Management of Contractors is typically reasonably good across sites, with the possible exception of failure to consider past performance of contractors in ongoing selection processes. A process to define acceptance criteria and to assess past performance of contract firms via review of their OSHA logs is sometimes found to be a concern. One would think that compliance with the Hot Work element would be simplest of all since the requirements are clearly and prescriptively outlined in OSHA 29 CFR § 1910.252. Two of the most frequently identified concerns for this element are failure to maintain or document a fire watch present for 30 minutes after any welding or cutting operations. The other is failure to post additional fire watches on multi-level worksites where falling sparks may be a concern or conduction, or radiation may pose a concern to combustibles that cannot be removed or protected. Emergency Response is an area where the PSM and RMP standards diverge to some extent, including the distinction between offensive and defensive responders. Compliance with the PSM Emergency Response element is relatively straightforward and largely covered in 29 CFR 1910.38 - Emergency action plans. Where concerns are more often identified is in the RMP Emergency Response element, where the outward-looking activities are not always in perfect order. For example, all affected public receptors may not be identified and documented in the site emergency procedures, and/or the contact information for those receptors may not be tested on a regular basis. While not specifically a PSM or RMP requirement, the incident management plans for some companies do not take advantage of structuring their incident management systems in accordance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS); there is valuable free training offered through FEMA which will qualify site personnel to act in standardized ICS roles and enable good coordination with outside agencies in the event of a serious incident. Audits are deserving of their own blog article ( which you can find here ). The most common audit element theme found at various facilities is an audit that does not dig deep enough into process safety programs and into the evidence of execution of each program element. Audits are overdue more frequently than you might anticipate as well. When a good-quality periodic audit with actionable recommendations is executed, that is not the end of the process. The recommendations or actions from that audit then need to be tracked to completion and documented as complete in a reasonable period of time, and that is unfortunately lacking at a variety of facilities. The Stakes The PSM and RMP regulations have proven over time that they are excellent practices to drive the reduction of serious process safety incidents. It is far better for a company and sites to find and correct their own PSM and RMP system deficiencies than for a serious incident to occur or for a regulatory agency to identify it. Are you positive that the commonly found concerns reviewed above are not present at your facility? So What? If you have not previously taken a deep dive into the assessment of the topics above at your site, now would be a good time to do so. If you do not have the right expertise in your staff to assess PSM and RMP compliance in these areas, consider selecting a process safety consultancy with deep experience and expertise to assist you. Their range of experience enables external auditors to share the general methods proven to drive good PSM and RMP compliance across industry. This independence from the site and company has the best probability of a careful assessment with fresh eyes on the relevant critical systems and leads to more efficient compliance with the necessary standards. Click here for more information on aeSolutions' PSM & RMP Audit Services In Part 2 will include a review of common deficiencies in the elements of MOC/PSSR, Process Safety Information, Operating Procedures, Mechanical Integrity , Process Hazard Analysis, and Training.

  • The Purpose of Performing a PHA - 2 Minute Topic

    Updated - April 2026 - The ISA/IEC 61511 Safety Life Cycle starts with a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) and a Risk Assessment. What is a PHA? Why do we do it? =================================================== Excerpt taken from the webinar: Choosing a Risk Assessment Methodology In the full recording the ANSI/ISA 61511 Safety Life Cycle is shown to start with a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) and a Risk Assessment. This was the first webinar of our 3 part series and details the purpose of Risk Assessment and examines the advantages and limitations of various methodologies including Risk Graph, Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) , and others. See all our full recent webinars on https://www.aesolutions.com/webinars As a supplier of complete process safety and risk management solutions, we pride ourselves on providing engineers from industry with design, maintenance, operating, and process safety backgrounds. Our specialists understand how plants operate because they have actually worked in covered processes and facilities. Learn more-- https://www.aesolutions.com/process-s...

  • Safety Culture: Examining Common Shortcomings | Industrial Equipment News

    December 2024 - Learn about six hidden pitfalls that undermine workplace safety culture and learn actionable strategies to foster a more resilient and safety-conscious environment. This article explores the following topics and more: Click here to read the full article on IEN.com Applicability of Process Safety Management (PSM) and Risk Management Program (RMP) Regulations : Many facilities neglect to assess whether these regulations apply to their operations, leading to unstructured safety processes. Mechanical Integrity : While fixed equipment like vessels and piping are usually well-managed, issues frequently arise with rotating equipment and control systems due to inadequate monitoring and maintenance. Management of Change (MOC) : Organizations often fail to implement robust MOC procedures, resulting in unassessed risks when changes occur in processes or equipment. Operating Procedures : Outdated or poorly documented operating procedures can lead to unsafe practices and increased risk of incidents. Training and Competency : Insufficient training programs contribute to a workforce that is ill-prepared to handle safety challenges effectively. Incident Investigation : A lack of thorough incident investigations prevents organizations from learning from past mistakes and implementing corrective actions. by Judith Lesslie, CFSE, CSP, CCPSC , Senior Principal Specialist at aeSolutions . Read the full article here: Safety Culture: Examining Common Shortcomings - IEN.com

  • aeSolutions Recognized With Cigna Healthy Workforce Designation™

    Greenville, SC – February 1st, 2023 – Cigna has selected aeSolutions as a recipient of their Bronze level Healthy Workforce Designation for demonstrating a strong commitment to improving the health and well-being of its employees through a workplace wellness program. aeSolutions has shown a focus on the vitality & well-being of their workforce. This allowed employees to not only be healthier but to be more productive and engaged. “aeSolutions is driven by supporting every stakeholder in the pursuit of their full potential,” shared Ken O’Malley, President, and Founder. “This means we want our employees to thrive both professionally and personally. Providing a robust, year-round wellness program which supports and encourages the physical, mental, social, and financial health of not just our employees, but also their family members, is a critical component of our business’ success. I’m very proud that our results have been recognized and appreciated, by Cigna and by our team members.” Investing in an effective workplace well-being program drives value for employers. Senior executives surveyed as part of an Economist Impact study commissioned by Cigna reported greater productivity, stronger staff morale and motivation, and greater retention and loyalty as the most significant business outcomes of a healthy workforce. Additionally, a Gallup Report finds that on average, companies with high employee engagement are 23 percent more profitable. “As a consultative growth partner, Cigna knows that a healthy workforce is critical to business growth,” said Cindy Ryan, executive vice president and chief human resources officer. “We are honored to recognize organizations like aeSolutions who share our commitment to workplace wellness. Creating a healthy work culture is of critical importance, and many employers are seeing increased employee engagement, productivity, and retention as a result of whole person health wellness initiatives.” The Cigna Healthy Workforce Designation, formerly known as the Cigna Well-Being Award, evaluates organizations based on the core components of their well-being program, including leadership and culture, program foundations, program execution, and whole person health. Organizations recognized with this designation set the standard of excellence for whole-organization health. Cigna is proud to honor aeSolutions with the Bronze level designation for having made good progress towards a healthy work culture by establishing and growing their employee well-being and engagement program. About aeSolutions In business since 1998, aeSolutions is a consulting, engineering, and systems integration company that provides industrial process safety and automation products and services. They specialize in helping industrial clients achieve their risk management and operational excellence goals through expertise in process safety, combustion control and safeguarding, safety instrumented systems, control system design and integration, alarm management, and related operations and integrity management systems. For more information, visit www.aesolutions.com . Media Contact RedIron PR for aeSolutions Kari Ritacco kari@redironpr.com

  • FRC Flash of Genius - FIRST Robotics

    aeSolutions Erich Zende helps his FIRST Robotics Team with their robot. Nice pants Erich! Pictures courtesy of FRC Flash 1319 As insightful as conventional high school career aptitude surveys with pen and paper can be — hands-on, real world experience is instrumental in shaping capable young minds. Add high stakes adrenaline and stiff competition to the equation, and FRC Flash 1319 Robotics Team emerges as a fusion between the three. This FIRST (For Inspiration and Recognition of Science and Technology) Robotics team hails from Greenville, SC and competes in state and national level field games under the adept guidance of mentor and aeSolutions SIS FEL Specialist, Erich Zende. We conducted an informal interview with Erich at the close of the team’s regular season to discern a better understanding of the year-round volunteer effort he lends so much of himself to . aeSolutions: What is your role on the FRC Flash 1319 team? Erich Zende: I am the Lead Mechanical Design Mentor and Drive Team Coach for the robotics team. I lead the students through the design, prototype, and build phases during a six-week build season, and I also advise students on the safe use of tools and other safety procedures. Pictures courtesy of FRC Flash 1319 aeSolutions: The advisory role concerning proper tool usage and safety procedures makes sense, given that safety is one of the fundamentals that embodies the spirit of aeSolutions. How much of your personal resources (time, money, energy) do you invest per season? Erich Zende: During the build season I meet with the students for roughly 30 hours a week, for six weeks, and during the weeks leading up to the competitions I meet with students somewhere between 20-30 hours. The majority of this time is spent practicing with a prototype robot along with packing spares and tools for the competition, as well as going over the presentations prepared by students for the judged technical awards at completion. Typically, FRC Flash 1319 competes at 2 or 3 select events. In total, I contribute an overall average of 250 hours give or take. In order to mentor to my fullest ability, I contribute 8-10 days of my time- off-with-pay, my hotel rooms expenses, occasional robot parts, and a trailer to transport the team’s robot. Pictures courtesy of FRC Flash 1319 aeSolutions: It goes without saying that you volunteer in multiple capacities. In regards to the season ending though, what does the “off-season” look like when the team isn’t gearing up for the building phase and qualifier competitions? Erich Zende: In the time period that we refer to as the “off-season,” I focus my time on recruiting and training new members. In regards to a combined effort, the team attends outreach events in addition to hosting several Lego League tournaments for the younger students interested in S.T.E.M. activities. Recently we hosted an event with one of our sponsors, the Synnex Corporation, to put on a STEAM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Arts and Math) Girls Night Out. This was a Makerspace event created to inspire, empower and engage girls in grades 3rd to 8th in Greenville County. The goal was to help foster young girls’ appreciation for STEAM and raise STEAM awareness among parents. The event boasted an overall attendance exceeding 350 students. Aside from requested team demonstrations at Roper Mountain Science Center, we also take part in the IMAGINE Upstate Annual Festival; which showcases pre-K through 12th grade education and STEAM career pathways centered on having fun and hands-on learning. Pictures courtesy of FRC Flash 1319 aeSolutions: Given what you’ve told me, the season isn’t necessarily limited to building and competing for a span of a few months but rather it’s a year-round effort of recruiting, team building and spreading awareness. It’s clear what you give to the program and the impact you have on the malleable futures of these students, but what do you get out of this exactly? What keeps you coming back year after year? Erich Zende: There are many reasons why I continue to mentor. Although challenging for a variety of reasons, the rewards generally make it all a worthwhile endeavor each and every year. Speaking of years, this will be my 16th year as a mentor and 20th year participating in FIRST Robotics. To be more specific: I mentor because others mentored me. I mentor to hopefully aid and impact future generations of students who will be contributing members of our society. I learn something new every year, and I enjoy the competitive experience. I mentor because the robotics team is a creative outlet outside of my day job. And truly, I mentor because I yearn for my daughter to have a long-standing and well-developed STEM program to be a part of when she is older. Pictures courtesy of FRC Flash 1319 aeSolutions: Well said. Special thanks to Erich Zende for the continued efforts and contributions to this FIRST Robotics team. You have not only gone above and beyond for the robotics team, but you have also created a praiseworthy legacy that speaks to the very core of this company. More information on FIRST Robotics Click here to keep up with Erich Zende and the FRC Flash 1319, visit the team website Or follow them on social media: https://www.facebook.com/pg/FRCFlash1319 https://twitter.com/FRCFlash1319 https://www.instagram.com/frcflash1319/ https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCG40LSBnquEsIMQ2hyiyv8w #aesolutions

  • Whitepaper — SIL ratings and certification for fire & gas system hardware — Is industry barking up the wrong tree?

    There are many devices (sensors, logic solvers and final elements) used in safety instrumented systems  that are independently certified for use in safety applications to different safety integrity levels (SIL). There is considerable debate however whether fire and gas system hardware should have SIL ratings at all. Vendors are naturally interested in promoting independently certified hardware in order to differentiate their products. Considering the differences between safety instrumented systems and fire and gas systems, focusing on the SIL rating or performance of the actual fire and gas hardware  alone is considered by some to be a misleading and questionable practice. This paper reviews a) the differences between safety instrumented systems and fire and gas systems, b) how typical voting of fire and gas sensors not only reduces nuisance trips (which is desirable) but also reduces the likelihood of the system actually responding to a true demand (which is not desirable), and c) why concepts and standards that apply to safety instrumented systems (e.g., SIL ratings) may not be appropriate for fire and gas systems . Click here for the complete whitepaper ​

  • Using the STAMP Systems-Based Approach to Identify Hazards for the Transient Operating State

    STAMP ( Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes ) is a relatively new accident causality model based on systems theory. It draws its main tenets from systems thinking that (1) accidents can happen even when there has been no failure, (2) that interactions between components of the system create emergent properties that can lead to failure, and (3) it treats accidents as a control problem rather than a failure problem. STPA (Systems Theoretic Process Analysis) or colloquially “Stuff That Prevents Accidents” is a powerful hazard analysis technique based on STAMP. The STPA technique is based on a control structure rather than a traditional hardware-based structure as typically shown on a P&ID (Piping & Instrumentation Diagram). STPA is not so concerned with identifying component failures, but rather how those components interact and what controls or constraints are placed on the interactions that can lead to hazards. The STPA technique is a good fit for identifying the ways hazards can arise during transient operating states such as maintenance, start-up, or response to abnormal situation. It identifies unsafe or missing controls related to the transient mode needed to prevent an accident. It works off of a control structure of the transient mode versus procedures or P&IDs. A typical control structure can include components, humans, software, requirements, expectations (written and unwritten). Traditional PHA (Process Hazards Analysis) methods such as HAZOP or What-if will not provide the same perspective. This paper will provide two examples of transient mode control structures, one for maintenance and one for response to abnormal situation, and show how to perform the STPA hazard analysis on those control structures to ensure the proper controls and constraints are identified to prevent an unwanted event. This paper was originally presented at the 2022 AIChE Spring Meeting & 18th Global Congress on Process Safety. Click here to view the complete whitepaper CHAZOP : Controls Hazard Operability Study

  • Using Small Data to Support Decision Making When LOPA Fails

    The case for incorporating site specific process safety data into our calculations, and how to do it. Originally presented at the AIChE 2023 Spring Meeting and 19th Global Congress on Process Safety If we’re honest with ourselves, Process Safety has a lack of data problem. Nowhere does this show up more than in the types of calculations we perform for Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and Safety Integrity Level (SIL) calculations, for example. Sure, we have generic failure data. But do we have the confidence that this generic data is right for our specific application? In addition, many LOPA scenarios contain “one-off” equipment parameters (either initiating event frequency or probability of failure) for which there is no generic data, leaving teams guessing at what value to use. Worse, LOPA targets are getting smaller (i.e., 1e-5 or 1e-6 per yr) which often leaves gaps, requiring decisions to be made regarding capital spending. Sticking with generic data in these cases can leave us feeling that we are being too conservative. On the Operations and Maintenance side of the LOPA equation, we face similar problems when attempting to verify the installed performance of an IPL (Independent Protection Layer). A multitude of assumed parameters (e.g., failure rates, test and inspection intervals, time in bypass, etc.) for which we would like a method to incorporate actual site data into the values used during design. And ideally this method could optimize these parameters for potential cost savings (for example, extending maintenance intervals). This paper will present a straightforward and easy to use method for feeding operational data back into process safety calculations, using commercial software that is already running on your computer. The paper will explore how much data is needed to confidently claim a parameter value, starting with an assumed or generic value, and periodically updating that value with small data, as evidence (from testing, maintenance, actual demands, etc.) is collected over time. The authors have been using these methods successfully on real process safety applications for several years now, that were all triggered by difficulties and shortcomings in LOPA. These application case studies will be discussed as well. Click here to view the complete whitepaper

  • Understanding Overpressure Scenarios and RAGAGEP

    by Ron Nichols Introduction to Using RAGAGEP for Overpressure Risk Mitigation : Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a key tool used by the chemical, oil, and gas industries to assist companies in identifying, implementing and managing the critical safeguards needed to achieve their risk tolerance criteria. The Process Hazard analysis for some sites may be regulatory driven (e.g., Occupational, Health and Safety Administration’s (OSHA’s) 29 CFR 1910.119 Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (PSM), or the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (USEPA’s) 40 CFR 68 Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions (RMP)). During the PHA the team identifies consequences of concern arising from potential process deviations, identifies existing safeguards, or if LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis) is required, the Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) available to reduce the likelihood of the consequence to a tolerable risk level. If the team identifies a gap between the potential event likelihood, severity and the minimum target set by the company, the team will propose recommendations to close the gap. An overpressure scenario can be a significant contributor to the risk of a facility. Overpressure of pressure vessels, piping, and other equipment can result in loss of containment of flammable or toxic materials. This paper will develop guidance including related RAGAGEP (Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice) to help engineers and designers participate in the safety lifecycle for managing the risk of overpressure. Click here for the complete whitepaper

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