Search results for "control system migration"

by Keith Brumbaugh Is our industry stuck in the past? The current industry trend is to only look at random hardware failures in safety integrity level (SIL) probability of failure on demand (PFD) ca lculations. No one would appear to be updating assumptions as operating experience is gained. Hardware failure rates are generally fixed in time, assumed to be average point values (rather than distributions), and either generic in nature or specific to a certain set of hardware and/or conditions which the vendors determine by suitable tests or failure mode analysis. But are random hardware failures the only thing that cause a safety instrumented function (SIF) to fail? What if our assumptions are wrong? What if our installations do not match vendor assumptions? What else might we be missing? How are we addressing systematic failures? One obvious problem with incorporating systematic failures is their non-random nature. Many functional safety practitioners claim that systematic errors are addressed (i.e., minimized or eliminated) by following all the pro cedures in the ISA/IEC 61511 standard. Y et even if the standard were strictly adhered to, could anyone realistically claim a 0% chance of a SIF failing due to a human factor? Some will say that systematic errors cannot be predicted, much less modeled. But is that true? This paper will examine factors which tend to be ignored when performing hardware-based reliability calculations. Traditional PFD calculations are merely a starting point. This paper will examine how to incorporate systematic errors into a SIF’s real-world model. It will cover how to use Bayes theorem to capture data after a SIF has been installed — either through operating experience or industry incidents — and update the function’s predicted performance. This methodology can also be used to justify prior use of existing and non-certified equipment. Click here to view the complete whitepaper

ABSTRACT A systematic database approach can be used to design, develop and test a Safety Instrumented System This paper will demonstrate that through a database approach, the design deliverables and system configuration Topics Include: ANSI/ISA S84.01 , Safety Instrumented Systems , Safety Instrumented Functions , Safety

This assessment tool determines conceptual compliance of a facility’s Burner Management System (BMS) It highlights important findings for a facility’s fired equipment system.

performance criteria for achieving design objectives, fuel train, field devices, logic solver platform, control , startup sequences & shutdown interlocks logic, Human Machine Interface (HMI) displays, Combustion Control System (CCS) interaction, training, operation and maintenance procedures. solver platform certified to IEC 61508 for SIL 2 or greater and approved by the client for the BMS control Implement seamless CCS interaction and required control for proper functioning of the startup sequences

by aeSolutions Technical Team Implementing a Safety Instrumented Burner Management (SI‐BMS) can be challenging, costly, and time consuming. Simply identifying design shortfalls/gaps can be costly, and this does not include costs associated with the capital project to target the gap closure effort itself. Additionally, when one multiplies the costs by the total number of heaters at different sites, these total costs can escalate quickly. However, a “template” approach to implementing SI‐BMS in a brownfield environment can offer a very cost effective solution for end users. Creating standard “templates” for all deliverables associated with a SI‐BMS will allow each subsequent SI‐BMS to be implemented at a fraction of the cost of the first. This is because a template approach minimizes rework associated with creating a new SIBMS package. The ultimate goal is to standardize implementation of SI‐BMS in order to reduce engineering effort, create standard products, and ultimately reduce cost of ownership. Click here to view the complete whitepaper What is a BMS? What is Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) What is Function Safety?

Implementing Safety Instrumented System (SIS) projects that support the long‐term viability of the Process here to view the complete whitepaper Topics Include: IEC 61511, ISA/IEC 61511 , Safety Instrumented Systems

Commission (IEC) published Edition 2 of the IEC 61511 standard, “Functional Safety – Safety Instrumented Systems This standard covers the design and management requirements for a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) throughout

OSHA contended that the boiler was interconnected to a covered process through the refinery fuel gas system Often the default for the Burner Management System (BMS) is the application of NFPA. incorporates the appropriate application-based safety integrity level (SIL) for safety instrumented systems conclusion: PSM covered facilities should evaluate the applicability of their PSM and NFPA management systems , Fired Equipment, Safety Instrumented Systems, ISA/IEC 61511, NPFA 85, NFPA 86, NFPA 87, ISA 84, OSHA

During my 24+ years in alarm management, I have collaborated with various companies on their distributed control I am consistently asked what my favorite and least favorite control systems are to work on. system to system. Ideally, a control system would be “air-gapped” in order to minimize the possibility of introducing intrusions Upon entering the control room, my colleague and I were greeted by what is inarguably the nicest control

aeSolutions recognized an industry need for Fire and Gas panels based on a SIL capable PLC safety control Large industrial clients were looking for a system capable of monitoring and controlling Fire system 1/0, combustible gas, toxic gas, and oxygen depletion detectors, initiating suppression release, controlling To develop the Fire and Gas system requirements needed by industry, we first needed to understand the This code requires the use of NFPA 72 for fire alarm signaling systems.

The result of such studies is often a “refinement” of the control and/or safety system. of shared instrumentation between protection layers, addressing response time issues, and assessing control system protection layers for full independence of a function against the initiating event and other The benefit of such studies is that it’s easier and less expensive to make necessary changes to systems Process Safety & Risk Management Industrial Safety Instrumented Systems

Houston, TX - February 20, 2024 - aeSolutions, a leading consulting, engineering, and systems integration , focusing on fired equipment, alarm management, process safety management, and safety instrumented systems their risk management and operational excellence goals through expertise in process safety, combustion control and safeguarding, safety instrumented systems, fire and gas, control system design and integration, alarm management, and related operations and integrity management systems.