Search this site
173 results found with an empty search
- Panel Discussion : The New Engineering Business
Join some of the aeSolutions team as we hold a panel discussion on the New Engineering Business, held as part of Engineers Week 2021. Engineers Week is “dedicated to ensuring a diverse and well-educated future engineering workforce by increasing understanding of and interest in engineering and technology careers.” Moderated by Ben Burris. Founded by National Society of Professional Engineers in 1951, Engineers Week is dedicated to ensuring a diverse and well-educated future engineering workforce by increasing understanding of and interest in engineering and technology careers. Learn more from the NSPE At aeSolutions, we know that our success is a result of having talented, dedicated and passionate team members driving our projects. If working for a company that takes on complex challenges in nearly every capacity interests you, we would love to talk to you. We are proud to have over 50 certified engineers on staff.
- Key Considerations Establishing Site or Corporate SIS Guidelines
Updated April 2026 — by aeSolutions Technical Team - As best stated in the IEC 61511-2 standard, “the purpose of adopting a systematic safety lifecycle approach towards a safety instrumented system (SIS) is to ensure that all the activities necessary to achieve functional safety are carried out and that it can be demonstrated to others that they have been carried out in an appropriate order.” Conforming to the ISA84/IEC 61511 design and management requirements for a SIS throughout a process safety project requires attention to detail every step of the lifecycle, and a well-established site or corporate SIS guideline can help set a company up for success. This blog describes key considerations to developing SIS guidelines, with the SIS lifecycle generalized into three main sections: Concept Through Startup, Operations and Maintenance, and Management of Functional Safety and Lifecycle Planning. Concept Through Startup Concept Through Startup encompasses Phases 1 through 4 of the IEC 61511 standard which includes hazard and risk assessments, allocation of safety functions to protection layers, Safety Requirements Specification (SRS), and design of an SIS. A hazard and risk assessment is the starting point since it sets the foundation of the overall hazard level at a site. The team should identify any significant hazards or concerns and establish the need for a SIS based on the plant design and operating system. The company’s risk tolerance is also a key consideration since a low hazard site with very tight risk tolerance may result in driving more need for a safety system than a high hazard site with a low risk tolerance. It is also important to understand what categories of risk drive the need for the safety system. There are two risk drivers sites must consider at a minimum – the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requiring both onsite and offsite personnel safety and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requiring environmental protections. Other risk drivers a facility may be concerned about are financial and reputational drivers. Once hazards have been identified, the next step is to establish the safety system requirements. A conceptual specification can help provide an overall picture of the whole system before diving into the details of the individual protection layers involved. For example, a big picture concept is to differentiate between the basic control system and the safety system. Basic control systems are the first response to maintain continuous operation with the end goal of a profitable product; safety systems focus on operating the plant safely and are initiated if the control system does not return the process to a normal state, ideally without significantly impeding the operability or profitability of the site. The Safety Requirements Specification (SRS) dives into the detailed requirements; a well-honed SRS includes the requirements for all the SIS lifecycle stages described in IEC 61511. Further details may be incorporated on how the basic process control system (BPCS) and SIS communicate (e.g., gateway, hardwired connections, etc.) as well as how the SIS interfaces with other systems. SIS design can encompass fine-tuned details that are not readily meaningful to an audience at large and may only be truly meaningful to those performing safety verification calculations. For this reason, a corporate SIS program ideally provides well-grounded templates, document samples, and guidance for creation of new documents. It also clearly defines what should be covered in the site or corporate SRS. The details should be understandable and not buried in other documents to maximize consistency and minimize human factors error. Operations and Maintenance Operations and Maintenance encompasses Phases 5 through 8 of the IEC 61511 standard, which includes safety system installation, commissioning and validation, operation and maintenance, modification, and decommissioning. Once a process has been installed and commissioned, it needs to be actively operated and maintained. It takes a number of years of experience in operation of a safety system for a Functional Safety Assessment (FSA) to truly reveal trends of how the SIS responds to process deviations. If a SIS needs to be modified or decommissioned, a Management of Change (MOC) is essential to flag whether the modification is Process Safety Management (PSM) oriented and if a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) for the change is required. MOCs are a key consideration to reducing human factors errors during SIS modification since they help control system access and provide a vendor management list and/or an approved critical devices list. This allows anyone replacing SIS devices or doing maintenance work to recognize which devices are approved for use in critical safety service. Critical device lists are most effective when they are orderly, easy to interpret, and easy to access. Properly managing all the pieces and parts during decommissioning must be addressed as well. Sometimes only a portion of a SIS – such as a single loop – may be decommissioned, while other times the entire SIS may be decommissioned to upgrade to a newer system. Management of Functional Safety and Lifecycle Planning Management of Functional Safety and Lifecycle Planning encompasses Phases 9 through 11 of the IEC 61511 standard. These phases cover safety system verification, management of functional safety, FSAs and audits, and safety lifecycle structure and planning. Clause 5.2.2 of Phase 10 describes the organizational structure necessary to ensure that roles dedicated throughout the SIS lifecycle are clearly defined and personnel have the skills for their respective responsibilities. It is key to know who will be involved in the safety system lifecycle including corporate leaders, site personnel, contractors, vendors, in addition to how they will be managed (e.g., training, extent of accountability, etc.). The SIS lifecycle management program should be defined in such a way that every person involved is aware of the importance of any decisions made around the SIS as well as their part within the process of making or implementing those decisions. Participants in safety lifecycle management must also understand what constitutes proper execution of duties to fulfill their lifecycle responsibility functions in a timely manner. The corporate or site SIS lifecycle management program should also minimize the possibility of a project team preference driving crucial safety decisions as opposed to IEC 61511 requirements. Clause 5.2.6.2 of Phase 10 describes the SIS auditing process. Audits are required to assess the SIS over time to ensure it continues to meet the requirements of the IEC 61511 standard. As a SIS continues through each phase of the lifecycle, independent audits check for any potential safety risks or human error and ensure the people involved are properly trained and capable of competently fulfilling their duties. Safety lifecycle structure and planning is covered in Phase 11. Some key planning considerations to prepare a SIS corporate or site standard are to define in advance an agreed upon safety lifecycle of the SIS which will be implemented, map out each phase and stage shown in Figure 8 of IEC 61511 with consideration to assumptions or information that may not be available until later phases, and identify the techniques needed in order to carry out each phase. After laying out a lifecycle roadmap, the agreed upon details – such as design parameter assumptions for SIL verification, failure rate data, effectiveness and approved type of proof test to be carried out – should be incorporated into the corporate or site SIS guidelines. When planning how to implement the SIS application program, consideration should be given to device degradation. For example, will devices have internal diagnostics available? Will they output a fault signal under specific conditions? Will any kind of deviation alarming be implemented between devices? Could device faults be tripled, assuming there could be a hazardous state that the process is not protected against? Or will the operator be allowed time to identify the fault, correct it, and continue to run the process safely? When these decisions are made, other safeguards should be acknowledged as well. Such as the idea that sites may desire to allow the SIS to “ride through” a received fault signal if there are redundant field devices installed (unless it is the last protected device), or sites may desire not to allow the system to “ride through” a received fault signal if there are no redundant safeguards available. Proper documentation control is absolutely critical to managing site or corporate SIS standards as well. The site or corporate SIS standards and any associated documents need to not only be easy to understand but also readily available and accessible to anyone who may need to reference them. Files should be saved in an intuitive and logical folder location and should not be stored exclusively on any vendor system. Finally, timeliness is a key consideration to establishing corporate or site SIS standards. Critical decisions made after the PHA and before detailed SIS design have significant impacts later in the lifecycle – such as financial risk due to late discoveries on capital projects. Simply put, the sooner a standard is agreed upon and implemented, the better. If you want a consistent and meaningful approach, consider developing your site or corporate SIS standard before design has been completed. One caveat is the corporate or site SIS standard should be established with a full understanding of the SIS in advance. If you are new to PSM or SIS, consider selecting a process safety consultancy with deep experience and expertise to assist you in navigating the IEC 61511 safety lifecycle from hazard and risk assessment through design, commissioning, and operations. SIS lifecycle decisions can be extremely costly and unnecessary if reviewed through too conservative a lens, while other lifecycle decisions can be dangerous if not reviewed through enough of a conservative lens. The key is to find the right balance and level of detail appropriate to your facility to avoid unnecessary costs or unmitigated safety risk. Keywords: ISA-61511 IEC 61511 SIS Corporate Standards Program Development Functional Safety Planning
- Decoding SIS: Are You Doing What’s Necessary to Prevent Disasters?
Updated April 2026 — by aeSolutions Technical Team When your facility is tasked with industry safety standard compliance, where do you start? What do all those SIS acronyms mean? For OSHA PSM-covered facilities, adherence to a functional safety lifecycle can be a critical step in overall SIS performance assurance. What is hiding under the radar of a plant SIS? Risk assessments define hazard consequences with assumed initiating event frequencies. How do we prevent these consequences? By verifying the reliability and availability assumptions of SIL Verification design parameters. Without understanding the design parameters your SIS is based upon, or without proper maintenance of your SIS equipment, your risk assessment gap closure may be incomplete. What factors into the assumptions of an SIS design? Are your safety devices replaced at their specified asset life, tested at the interval, and tested with the necessary rigor to uncover dangerous failures as specified in your calculations? What does following the Functional Safety Lifecycle entail? Does your facility have a Functional Safety Management Plan, perform Functional Safety Assessments on your SIS Design, and keep records of device failures to evaluate field performance against assumed reliability? This paper illustrates the real consequences of failing to uphold SIS design assumptions or follow the Functional Safety Lifecycle. Click here to view the complete whitepaper Prepared for Presentation at American Institute of Chemical Engineers 2024 Spring Meeting and 20th Global Congress on Process Safety New Orleans, LA March 24-28, 2024
- The PHA Recommendation Playbook | Part 2 | Untangling Technical Complexity
Introduction | When “Just Fix It” Isn’t That Simple Updated April 2026 — by aeSolutions Technical Team — This blog is the second installment in our PHA Recommendation Playbook series, which is intended to help Process Safety, EHS, and facility managers overcome the common challenges they face when trying to close Process Hazard Analysis recommendations. If you missed Part 1, we explored how staffing and budget limitations create obstacles that can stall even the most straightforward resolutions. In this article, we’re focusing on a challenge that doesn’t always get the attention it deserves: technical complexity. While some recommendations from a PHA might seem routine at first glance, others involve engineering considerations, system interdependencies, or implementation feasibility that turn them into long-haul capital project efforts. These complications can extend gap closure timelines, inflate costs, and even introduce new risks if not addressed with requisite knowledge and intentionality. Technical Challenges in PHA Recommendations | What Makes Them So Complex? Technical complexity refers to the engineering depth, system interdependencies, or feasibility issues that complicate the implementation of PHA recommendations. In industrial environments, this might include design changes that require coordination between multiple engineering disciplines, recommendations that call for feasibility studies, or changes to safety instrumented systems that necessitate revalidation. Sometimes, the complexity lies in hidden system dependencies, meaning that fixing one issue inadvertently introduces another. Compatibility concerns also surface, particularly when legacy systems aren’t designed to accommodate newer technology. Complicating matters further, many of these challenges aren’t fully apparent during the PHA session itself. A recommendation may seem simple on the surface — “install a relief valve” or “update control logic” — but as the team attempts to move forward with recommendation implementation, the depth of technical complexity becomes clear. The Compliance Cost of Complexity | What Are the Risks of Unresolved PHA Recommendations? Delays caused by technical complexity come with consequences. Regulatory expectations require timely closure of PHA recommendations or, at the very least, well-documented justifications for delays. Facilities that fail to address these recommendations in a structured way may face unexpected audit findings, regulatory scrutiny, or even fines. Beyond compliance, unresolved technical items can increase safety risks. A partially implemented fix or an unaddressed hazard can lead to new vulnerabilities or process weaknesses. From an operational standpoint, unresolved recommendations may lead to unplanned downtime, deferred maintenance, or extended outage windows. Over time, these delays can cause friction between departments and erode trust in the process. How Should You Navigate Complex Technical PHA Recommendations Internally? Handling complex recommendations starts with engaging the right people early. Engineering, operations, maintenance, and safety teams must be aligned on what’s practical, what’s required, and what constraints exist. Cross-functional collaboration is essential for identifying implementation barriers before a plan is set in motion. Conducting feasibility reviews internally can reveal potential problems with space, access, process compatibility, or cost. These reviews don’t have to be overly formal, but they should be consistent and thorough enough to inform the feasibility of implementation of the recommendation at a high level. Documenting known interdependencies also helps ensure one recommendation doesn’t inadvertently conflict with another. Instead of treating each recommendation as a siloed task, consider how they fit into the broader operational strategy. Iterative planning, where adjustments are made as new information surfaces, can help prevent bottlenecks and avoid over-committing resources. When Does Technical Complexity Require External Expertise? There are times when a PHA recommendation goes beyond internal capacity, whether due to staffing limitations or the depth of technical expertise required. Yet not all third-party support is created equal. Some firms deliver a report and walk away, leaving your team with a list of action items and little else in the form of background education. Working with an experienced third-party can change the dynamic. The right partner doesn’t just identify risks; they help you engineer prioritized solutions that are feasible, effective, and aligned with your facility’s operations. A third-party familiar with system interdependencies can offer practical mitigation strategies that don’t introduce new problems elsewhere. Execution also matters. A partner that provides project management oversight can track progress, maintain accountability, and deliver documentation that supports audit defensibility. By helping prioritize what matters most and sequencing efforts strategically, an experienced partner can support smarter capital planning and more efficient implementation. Collaboration with a third-party should never feel like you’re relinquishing control. Instead, it should feel like gaining clarity with a clear line of sight from risk to resolution, with results your team can stand behind. What Are Proactive Strategies to Minimize Technical Implementation Risks? Managing technical complexity isn’t only about reacting once a challenge appears. Many of the difficulties associated with implementation can be mitigated through proactive planning. Three core proactive strategies include: Integrating front-end engineering and risk assessment into your safety processes. This helps identify potentially complex recommendations earlier in the lifecycle. Flagging technically intensive items during the PHA itself or revalidation workshops, so that additional analysis can be scoped and scheduled. Allocating budget and time for follow-up studies, such as feasibility analyses, LOPA updates, or HAZOP reviews, when recommendations involve significant system changes. Maintaining clear documentation is also essential. It not only aids internal decision-making but strengthens your position during audits or external reviews. Finally, it helps to reframe these efforts not just as compliance tasks but as opportunities to improve long-term reliability and operational resilience of your facility. From Risk to Resilience | Technical PHA Resolution Isn’t Just a Fix—It’s a Foundation Facilities that manage technical complexity well don’t just avoid problems, they build stronger, safer operations. When engineering, safety, and operations teams work together to resolve complex PHA recommendations, the resulting improvements often go beyond the immediate fix. Systems become more reliable. Cross-team collaboration improves. Equipment failures and unplanned outages decrease. Moreover, facilities gain stronger footing in the face of audits or regulatory reviews. Well-documented resolutions with traceability to risk assessments show diligence and intent, both of which matter when follow-up questions are asked. When resolutions are handled with care, the outcome shouldn’t feel like a temporary workaround. It should feel like progress. The Takeaway | Moving from Technical Complexity to Technical Confidence Technical complexity is one of the more nuanced challenges in PHA recommendation resolution. It’s also one of the easiest to underestimate. The surface-level simplicity of a recommendation often belies the engineering coordination, feasibility analysis, and systems thinking required to see it through. By planning ahead, involving the right teams, and knowing when to seek experienced, third-party expertise, your facility can navigate even the most intricate recommendations without losing momentum. And when you do choose to bring in third-party support, working with a team that understands engineering, project delivery, and compliance can be the difference between checking a box and building something truly defensible. At its best, technical resolution doesn’t just close a gap, it builds a stronger foundation. From risk to resilience, the path is clearer when the process is collaborative, strategic, and informed.
- Lessons Learned on SIL Verification and SIS Conceptual Design
Updated April 2026 - Written by aeSolutions Technical Team - There are many critical activities and decisions that take place prior to and during the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Verification and other Conceptual Design phases of projects conforming to ISA84 & ISA/IEC 61511. These activities and decisions introduce either opportunities to optimize, or obstacles that impede project flow, depending when and how these decisions are managed. Implementing Safety Instrumented System (SIS) projects that support the long‐term viability of the Process Safety Lifecycle requires that SIS Engineering is in itself an engineering discipline that receives from, and feeds to, other engineering disciplines. This paper will examine lessons learned within the SIS Engineering discipline and between engineering disciplines that help or hinder SIS project execution in achieving the long‐term viability of the Safety Lifecycle. Avoiding these pitfalls can allow your projects to achieve the intended risk reduction and conformance to the ISA/IEC 61511 Safety Lifecycle, while avoiding the costs and delays of late‐stage design changes. Alternate execution strategies will be explored, as well as the risks of moving forward when limited information is available. Click here to view the complete whitepaper Topics Include: IEC 61511, ISA/IEC 61511 , Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) , Independent Protection Layers (IPL) , Functional Safety Assessment (FSA) , Safety Requirement Specification (SRS) , Safety Lifecycle , Functional Safety Management Plan (FSMP ), Project Execution Plan (PEP), SIS Front‐End Loading (SIS FEL), Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA ), SIL Verification
- What is a Stage 1 FSA & How Can It Help Discover Critical SIS Flaws?
Updated April 2026 — Imagine discovering a critical flaw in your safety system design before your plant goes operational. This scenario, while nerve-wracking, underscores the importance of early intervention in the design phase. When developing a Safety Instrumented System (SIS), it’s crucial to ensure that the hardware and software meet the practical needs identified from the initial hazard and risk assessment. That’s the purpose of a functional safety assessment (FSA). How can stage 1 FSA help discover critical SIS flaws? FSAs, as defined by IEC 61511 , provide a five-stage, evidence-based investigation to judge the functional safety achieved by one or more SIS and/or other protection layers. Stages 1 through 3 of the FSA encompass the SIS from its original concept through design, construction, and commissioning. Stage 1 specifically takes place after the hazard and risk assessments have been completed and before detailed design work begins, which can help with the early identification of design flaws and safety issues. Here’s what to expect in the Stage 1 FSA process, along with recommendations for a successful outcome. What Are the Goals of a Stage 1 FSA? A well-executed FSA reduces the likelihood of safety incidents. For FSA Stage 1, the primary goal is to verify that the safety requirements specification (SRS) accurately reflects the needs identified during the hazard and risk assessments. Does what’s on paper reflect the scenario in which the SIS must operate in the real world? Will the SIS actually mitigate the risks identified in the hazard and risk assessment? By ensuring thorough verification of the SRS at this early stage, Stage 1 FSAs help prevent costly modifications and delays later in the project lifecycle. Proper planning leads to smoother project execution, reducing downtime, and increasing overall efficiency. The deliverable for a Stage 1 FSA includes a comprehensive report that presents findings, recommendations, and general observations. It is a good idea to loop in stakeholders to review this deliverable together to align on opportunities to course-correct and next steps. Key personnel include process engineers, control engineers, operations supervisors, and site leadership. What is the Anticipated Time, Cost, and ROI of a Stage 1 FSA? The effort for executing an FSA is minimal relative to the overall project. The initial cost of performing a Stage 1 FSA includes expenses related to document reviews, stakeholder interviews, and detailed analyses. The expense is minimal compared to the total project cost. The duration of a Stage 1 FSA can vary based on the project's size and complexity, typically involving several days of document reviews and interviews with key personnel. Failing to conduct a thorough Stage 1 FSA can lead to incomplete or incorrect safety requirements. This oversight can result in costly modifications, delays, and potentially catastrophic failures once the system is operational. These issues often incur far higher costs than the initial FSA investment. A Stage 1 FSA can help surface the following issues: ● Incomplete risk assessments ● Failure to capture safety requirements ● Insufficient detail in the preliminary assessments. ● Inadequate stakeholder engagement Conducting a Stage 1 FSA allows for early identification of design flaws and safety issues, which are less expensive to address in the design phase than during or after construction. What is The FSA Stage 1 Process? The FSA Stage 1 process typically consists of the following steps: ● Hazard and risk assessment verification ● Verification of safety requirements specification ● Operational readiness Table: Process Steps for FSA Stage 1 Process Step Objectives Hazard and Risk Assessment V ● Review of Hazard Analysis: Ensure that all potential hazards have been identified and assessed. ● Risk Assessment Validation: Confirm that the risk assessments accurately reflect the potential consequences and likelihood of identified hazards. Verification of Safety Requirements Specification ● Document Review: Verify that the SRS accurately captures all safety requirements derived from the hazard and risk assessments. ● Design Verification: Ensure that the proposed SIS design addresses all identified safety requirements and mitigates the associated risks. ● Cross-Functional Collaboration: Engage with multiple stakeholders to verify the SRS and ensure it reflects the input and expertise of all relevant parties. Operational Readiness ● Stakeholder Engagement: Confirm that all relevant stakeholders, including process engineers, control engineers, and operations personnel, are involved in the development and review of the SRS. What Are the Renewable Energy Implications As renewable energy sources reach maturity in the market, the nature of hazards and associated risks change with new unknowns and limited data. Consider the unique explosion and flammability risks of hydrogen, which is relatively new to the market. The hazard and risk assessments for hydrogen facilities must account for these unique dangers. Similarly, large-scale battery storage systems, essential for renewable energy, can suffer from thermal runaway leading to fires and explosions. Wind and solar farms present risks such as electrical hazards, mechanical failures, and environmental impacts. It is critical that the team conducting the FSA understands the unique hazards. Conclusion Stage 1 FSAs help prevent hazardous events and protect both personnel and assets. Engaging the team actively and addressing potential issues proactively can significantly enhance the effectiveness of Stage 1 FSAs, ensuring the safety and reliability of industrial operations. If you have any questions about your scenario, aeSolutions is here to provide support. Our team of industry experts are available to help navigate even the most unique challenges.
- The Use of Bayesian Networks in Functional Safety
Functional Safety & Bayesian Networks Functional safety engineers fol low the ISA/IEC 61511 standard & perform calculations based on random hardware failures. These result in low failure probabilities, which are then combined with similarly low failure probabilities for other safety layers, to show that the overall probability of an accident is extremely low (e.g., 1E-5/yr). Unfortunately, such numbers are based on frequentist assumptions and cannot be proven. Looking at actual accidents caused by control and safety system failures shows that accidents are not caused by random hardware failures. Accidents are typically the result of steady and slow normalization of deviation (a.k.a. drift). It’s up to management to control these factors. However, Bayes theorem can be used to update our prior belief (the initial calculated failure probability) based on observing other evidence (e.g., the effectiveness of the facility’s process safety management process). The results can be dramatic. For example, ass uming a safety instrumented function w ith a risk reduction factor of 5,000 (i.e., SIL 3 performance), and a process safety management program with a 99% effectiveness, results in the function actually having a risk reduction factor of just 98 (i.e., essentially the borderline between SIL1 and SIL 2). The key takeaway is that the focus of functional safety should be on effectively following all the steps in the ISA/IEC 61511 safety lifecycle and the requirements of the OSHA PSM regulation, not the math or certification of devices. Both documents were essentially written in blood through lessons learned the hard way by many organizations. To learn more about the use of Bayesian networks in functional safety , read the full paper here. Click here to view the complete whitepaper
- Taking credit for unplanned shutdowns as a Proof Test
By Keith Brumbaugh (CFSE, PE) and aeSolutions Technical Team Updated April 2026 - This blog post will examine the concept of taking proof test credit for an unplanned shutdown in order to delay a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) proof testing deadline. If scheduled outages go according to plan, this is unnecessary; however, when an outage gets postponed, credit for the unplanned trip may be needed to confirm the SIF still achieves its target risk reduction. Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) are required to be proof tested at specific intervals (expressed in months or years) in order to justify the calculated probability of failure on demand. Proof tests are performed to detect dangerous covert failures, which can render the SIF inoperable when it is most needed during a hazardous event. These proof tests are given a specified amount of coverage expressed as a percent of the dangerous failures detected vs total failures (detected and undetected). A proof test is typically undertaken during scheduled plant outages (for example, a turnaround). Unfortunately, the timing of an outage often shifts due to external circumstances. If the calculated SIF proof test interval is equal to the outage timing, then delaying an outage could result in a SIF that is no longer meeting its calculated probability of failure on demand. If the delay is long enough, the SIF could potentially fall below its performance target. This could result in the plant operating with an unmitigated risk gap. The concept of taking credit for an unplanned shutdown boils down to the fact that during an unplanned shutdown, all devices will typically trip and move to their safe state. This would apply to almost any SIF’s final elements (typically a valve or a pump). Using valves for example, many SIF valves are fail closed. If the air is vented from the actuator, or if the power is removed, the valve should close. If a final element is able to transition from the operating state to the safe state, and the transition can be proven, this is proof of the final element’s ability to function on demand. This actuation can be assigned appropriate coverage credit, and the credit can be applied to satisfy part of the SIF proof testing requirements, allowing for a delay in the full proof test. What devices can we take credit for? When determining what devices to credit in a trip, we need to examine what sensors, logic solvers, and final elements were involved. The first question we want to answer is what caused the trip: the SIF sensor or something else? For the logic solver, we need to determine how the trip was commanded. For the final element, we need to figure out what moved (or stopped moving). Typically SIF sensors will not be demanded during an unplanned shutdown. These devices are monitoring for a process upset. Unless the source of the unplanned shutdown was due to a process excursion involving the actual SIF, then the SIF sensor will be reading normal during the trip. Consequently, there would be no proof of the successful function of the sensor. Fortunately, this is not typically an issue as sensors are rarely the driving factor in a SIL calculation. For final elements such as valves, the valve body can almost always receive credit as long as it moved. The actuator, solenoid, and positioner will need a closer look, as well as the mechanism performing the trip of the valve. The user needs to consider what form of actuator and solenoid (or other positioner) was involved in the trip. This particularly makes a difference when a smart SIL-certified positioner is used rather than a solenoid. If the SIS logic did not demand the trip, it is possible the solenoid never moved and thus would not receive credit. On the other hand, when a valve uses a SIL-certified positioner, these are often driven to 0% during a shutdown by either the SIS logic solver, or even requested by the BPCS logic solver. Solenoids and positioners operate differently, so moving a positioner is not the same as breaking the circuit of a solenoid. The same concepts apply for other types of final elements. For example, for equipment driven by a motor, we need to figure out if the motor was stopped by the SIF relay or a BPCS relay. How much credit can we take? The next important question we need to answer is how much coverage credit we can take. Crediting the equivalent of a full stroke proof test is not recommended for an unplanned shutdown. In SIL calculations for valves, varying amounts of credit are given depending on whether you are performing a full stroke test or a partial stroke test, with the amount of credit determined by the robustness of the test. For example, a full stroke proof test could provide 90% proof test coverage, particularly if a leak test is performed. A partial stroke test might give 60% credit for moving the valve a minimal amount closed and then back open within a few seconds. As it can be reasoned, the partial stroke would detect only a subset of the failures that would be detected by the full stroke proof test. Because the partial stroke test only strokes the valve a portion of the total travel possible (and doesn’t fully close it), the partial stroke test would tell nothing about the integrity of the valve seat and associated leakage. The amount of credit possible due to an unplanned trip will not be the same as a full stroke proof test credit. The practitioner would need to examine what portion of failures would be detected during an unplanned trip (much like the partial stroke test). For example, the practitioner might assume the valve moved from the unsafe state to the safe state during the shutdown, but this would need proven. They might look to see if there is valve position feedback, including possibly a physical valve inspection at the time of the trip. If the practitioner does not have any indication that the valve moved, then it’s not possible to say the valve actually did. It is possible some other equipment brought the process to the safe state independent of the valve. Without feedback of the actual valve, the practitioner will never know if the valve actually moved. For motor driven equipment, positive indication of motor stoppage should be examined. For other types of final elements, such as electrostatic precipitators, credit for an unplanned trip requires verification by other means. Other Considerations Finally, we should confirm our devices are still operating within their design parameters (e.g. have they exceeded their manufacturer recommended replacement interval). Useful life is typically provided by the device vendor and has various connotations, one of which is how long a device’s failure rates are considered valid. If useful life is exceeded, the device may no longer have the same failure rate assumed in the SIL calculation. Useful life is typically longer than the proof test interval, and it becomes more relevant to this discussion as the devices ages. If the useful life will be expended by the next planned test, and the credit for the unplanned shutdown will push the turnaround beyond the useful life, then the device should be replaced during the unplanned shutdown. In summary, credit can be taken for an unplanned shutdown, but there must be careful consideration of the circumstances and justification. A primary concern in this process is that over crediting the test can lead to non-conservative results and additional risk. The practitioner must understand the mechanics of the unplanned shutdown to ensure appropriate credit is taken.
- Integrating PHA LOPA Outputs into Effective SIS Engineering
Updated April 2026 - We can help you pick up your PHA/LOPA which maybe been put to the side and provide the services to set you up for the safety system design phase. Standard SIS deliverables include the review of specification, confirming that the SIL levels are what they should be, and that the proof testing procedures are correctly documented to support your regular testing intervals. Transcript: "aeSolutions has a full suite of offerings and the safety lifecycle, from the PHA LOPA aspect in the upstream design all the way through into the detailed engineering phase. Our group SIS engineering (Safety Instrumented Systems) sits kind of right in the middle between the two, you have the PHA LOPA upstream and you've got the detailed design downstream. We take what the PHA LOPA outputs. We massage it a little bit to get it into a more meaningful list of safety functions, for example. And then we can take that through the conceptual design phase where it goes into SIL calculations and SRS's and cause and effects and gets that into a into a package that can ultimately be handed downstream into the design phase. Everything we do here is developing standard SIS deliverables by making sure that all the specifications are correct. All the safety integrated levels are what they should be. All the proof testing procedures are correctly documented. So that our clients can have regular testing intervals with the necessary equipment that they need to be testing. One of the things that we've seen a lot of our clients do is they'll do the PHA LOPA and then they'll take that information and they'll essentially file it away and do very little else with that. And one of the challenges that we've seen is the SIS needs to be designed against that document and so we can take that document either from an internal study or from a client and help pick it up and do the rest of the upstream engineering on it. Where we identify, what are your safety functions look like, how many sensors o you have? And get that into a more defined safety function that can ultimately be? Hand it off to the design team. The other aspects that we run into is a lot of times I'll do the front end engineering all the way through. You know, for example an SRS data sheet, but then they don't do things with it and ultimately the intention behind that is not only to use as an operating manual for your safety function, but you also want to use that as the guiding document in the design phase so that you ensure that everything that you're doing in the design. This matches what you intended it to do on the on the front end." PHA LOPA Process Safety
- How Taking Credit for Planned and Unplanned Shutdowns Can Help You Achieve Your SIL Targets
by Keith Brumbaugh , P.E., CFSE Achieving Safety Integrity Level (SIL) targets can be difficult when proof test intervals approach turnaround intervals of five years or more. However, some process units have planned and predictable unplanned shutdowns multiple times a year. During these shutdowns, it may be possible to document that the safety devices functioned properly. This can be incorporated into SIL verification calculations to show that performance targets can now be met without incorporating expensive fault tolerance , online testing schemes, etc. This can result in considerable cost savings for an operating unit. The problem If a process plant is following the ANSI/ ISA 84.00.0 1 process safety lifecycle (i.e. ISA 84) or similar, as part of the allocation of safety functions to protection layers phase, a SIL assessment (e.g., a Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA)) would be undertaken to assign Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) targets to a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) . A scenario could occur in the design and engineering phase of the ISA 84 safety lifecycle when performing the SIL verification calculations, that the team discovers the SIFs do not meet their performance target. Assuming the calculation was done properly using valid data and assumptions, something would need to change in order to meet or exceed the required performance targets. This issue could occur in a Greenfield plant when first designing a SIF, but is more likely to be discovered during a revalidation cycle of a brownfield plant. Click here to view the complete whitepaper
- Reducing Systematic Failures - Process Safety Management PSM
Updated April 2026 - Written by aeSolutions Technical Team - Some companies implement intermediate tasks during the analysis and design stages of an IEC/ISA 61511 Lifecycle Project with names such as “IPL Select” or “ LOPA Reconciliation”. The result of such studies is often a “refinement” of the control and/or safety system. Examples have ranged from identifying additional final elements to avoid the hazard, eliminating the use of shared instrumentation between protection layers, addressing response time issues, and assessing control system protection layers for full independence of a function against the initiating event and other protection layers. The benefit of such studies is that it’s easier and less expensive to make necessary changes to systems while the design is still on paper. It’s very expensive, and in some cases not even possible, to make design changes after systems have been installed. In the end, it all boils down to people. It is imperative that all personnel be competent in their roles within the Safety lifecycle. New people entering the industry need an opportunity to learn. Yet they need training, mentoring and reviews of their work in order to prevent systematic failures from creeping in and causing accidents. To read more examples of systematic failures throughout the lifecycle , and to learn how to reduce them, read the full paper “Methodologies in Reducing Systematic Failures of Wired IPLs” . Process Safety & Risk Management Industrial Safety Instrumented Systems
- Methodologies in Reducing Systematic Failures of Wired IPLs
by aeSolutions Technical Team & Tab Vestal Updated April 2026 - The history of high consequence incidents in industry reveals that most accidents were the result of systematic failures, not hardware failures. However, a higher degree of focus in engineering is often on the quantifiable failures of hardware. Process Safety risk gaps are often closed or reduced by several types of Independent Protective Layers (IPLs). Two common types are Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) and Basic Process Control System (BPCS) functions. The SIFs typically reside within a SIL-rated programmable logic controller, and their achieved quantitative performance is calculated based on random hardware failures of the SIF hardware components. Conversely, BPCS protective layers are assigned generic industry-accepted probability of failure credits. The BPCS generic industry-accepted probabilities of failure are conservatively assigned and consider unquantifiable human-induced systematic failures. In either case, the likelihood of systematic failures can be reduced by recognizing design, specification, maintenance, and operations activities that are potential sources, and applying measures to prevent or reduce them. By reducing systematic failures, you reduce the risk in the industrial process and increase confidence in meeting the intended integrity requirements. This technical paper will discuss the common sources of systematic failures and preventative or mitigative measures to prevent their occurrence. Topics Included in Whitepaper: Systematic failure , random hardware failure , Independent Protective Layer, IPL, SIF, SIS, BPCS , common cause, Human Factor Analysis , SIL Verification Click here to view the complete whitepaper












