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by Kelvin Severin PE Time is constantly working against operating equipment in a plant. Over time, components of the equipment reach the end of their useful lifespan and need to be replaced. Manufacturers go out of business or are no longer producing parts for antiquated equipment. The technology advances, and new and improved standardized models are developed, causing components to become outdated or obsolete. Many processing facilities in the United States were built decades ago and have never been upgraded. Maintaining aging equipment can be a challenge as parts for the old equipment are often no longer available or very expensive. For example, the manufacturer may no longer exist, or they may no longer produce the parts, or the components do not meet the newest revision of a regulatory standard. If aging equipment is not managed properly in relation to its expected lifespan, it can result in avoidable safety incidents, or maintenance and reliability issues. Most equipment has a specified life expectancy and pushing it beyond its useful life can put an operating facility at risk. Some older systems and instrumentation do not have the technology for diagnostics and therefore have no ability to query or troubleshoot the operating issue, resulting in extended shutdowns. Additionally, companies may face a loss of production and revenue in the event of mechanical issues with a piece of antiquated operating equipment, systems, or instrumentation that causes the process to go offline. A cost-effective first step to address aging equipment is a conceptual level screening checklist, that evaluates equipment systematically to identify deficiencies in the components. Facilities may be unaware of serious issues, and this checklist allows companies to make informed decisions and prioritize potential upgrades to aging equipment. This applies to both long-standing operating facilities as well as companies who recently purchased an existing facility, as they may not recognize the condition of all assets and/or older equipment they acquired. Refer to the aeSolutions blog, “Prioritizing Fired Equipment Upgrades Using Screening Checklists,” for further detail: https://www.aesolutions.com/post/prioritizing-fired-equipment-upgrades-using-screening-checklists After identifying areas of improvement, a plan can be developed for replacing the obsolete components that are approaching the end of their useful life. This plan should assess the safety concerns, mechanical concerns, and operational risks to the facility. It should also include a timeline for how soon the antiquated components should be replaced. The best replacement option is provided with qualities such as reliability and resilience to assure a long lifespan, aligning with regulatory codes, and adaptability to future system upgrades installed at the facility. Every facility should review its equipment to verify its life expectancy and ensure it is safe and reliable for continued operation. Suppose a facility is unable to find replacement parts or utilizes replacement parts sourced outside of the normal supply chain from the manufacturer to adapt to the existing system. In that case, this short-term solution could potentially perpetuate the mechanical and reliability issues. A conceptual level screening checklist can assess the status of aging equipment components, and proactive replacement measures can be taken to create a system of longevity and resilience going forward. Keywords: Obsolescence, Resilience, Robust, Outdated, Antiquated equipment, NFPA 85, NFPA 86, NFPA 87

Refinery plant in Wynnewood, Oklahoma. Updated June 2026 - In 2012, one of the steam boilers at the Wynnewood Refinery in Oklahoma exploded during a turnaround, resulting in the death of two workers. It was discovered that the boiler in question had a history of “hard starts.” As a result of this avoidable tragedy, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) cited Wynnewood Refining Company with multiple violations related to the Process Safety Management (PSM) standard under 29 CFR 1910.119. The incident at Wynnewood impacted the families of those harmed, the corporation’s reputation, and the bottom line. It also set a precedent for how facilities should implement PSM applicability, interconnectivity, and proximity for fired equipment. OSHA contended that the boiler was interconnected to a covered process through the refinery fuel gas system and steam header. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and ruled on behalf of OSHA that the boundary of a PSM process can extend beyond vessels and piping that contain hazardous chemicals. This ruling determined that utilities and fired equipment posing the risk of a catastrophic release, independent of their connection to hazardous materials, may be drawn into a site’s PSM covered processes. Many facilities rely on prescriptive applications, such as codes provided by the National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA), to manage fired equipment. While facilities have incorporated fired equipment, such as boilers, into their risk assessment process, the focus has historically been on the steam or process side of the equipment. Often the default for the Burner Management System (BMS) is the application of NFPA. Compliance with NFPA does not ensure compliance with OSHA PSM. In light of the Wynnewood ruling, PSM covered facilities must reevaluate their approach to fired equipment. Per NFPA 85*, utilizing the equivalency provision, an alternative design to meet the requirements of the code can be accomplished where all the following are provided: (1) Approval of the authority having jurisdiction. (2) A documented hazard analysis that addresses all the requirements of the code. (3) A documented life-cycle system safety analysis that addresses all requirements of the code and incorporates the appropriate application-based safety integrity level (SIL) for safety instrumented systems (SIS). The NFPA codes (85, 86, and 87) all reference ISA/IEC 61511 as a recognized methodology for achieving equivalency. Likewise, OSHA also recognizes ISA/IEC 61511 as Recognized and Generally Acceptable Good Engineering Practice (RAGAGEP) for PSM covered processes. The Wynnewood ruling points to one distinct conclusion: PSM covered facilities should evaluate the applicability of their PSM and NFPA management systems for their fired equipment to determine if they are in conformance with OSHA’s declared expectations. * Reference Added to clarify equivalency: NFPA 85 Boiler and Combustion System Hazard Code 2019 Annex A, A4.11. Keywords: Process Analysis, Process Safety Management, Combustion, Boilers, Fire Alarm Interconnected Systems, Fired Equipment, Safety Instrumented Systems, ISA/IEC 61511, NPFA 85, NFPA 86, NFPA 87, ISA 84, OSHA,

by aeSolutions Technical Team Implementing a Safety Instrumented Burner Management (SI‐BMS) can be challenging, costly, and time consuming. Simply identifying design shortfalls/gaps can be costly, and this does not include costs associated with the capital project to target the gap closure effort itself. Additionally, when one multiplies the costs by the total number of heaters at different sites, these total costs can escalate quickly. However, a “template” approach to implementing SI‐BMS in a brownfield environment can offer a very cost effective solution for end users. Creating standard “templates” for all deliverables associated with a SI‐BMS will allow each subsequent SI‐BMS to be implemented at a fraction of the cost of the first. This is because a template approach minimizes rework associated with creating a new SIBMS package. The ultimate goal is to standardize implementation of SI‐BMS in order to reduce engineering effort, create standard products, and ultimately reduce cost of ownership. Click here to view the complete whitepaper What is a BMS? What is Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) What is Function Safety?