Company to Continue to Focus on Client Success and Employee Development and Recruitment in 2024 Greenville, SC – February 28, 2024 – aeSolutions , a consulting, engineering, and systems integration company that provides industrial process safety and automation products and services,  today announces company milestones achieved and overall performance for 2023. The company’s achievements in the past year include impressive growth and a continued focus on employee recruitment and development.   “ In 2023, aeSolutions continued to demonstrate extraordinary resilience and to focus on firing on all cylinders in order to continually improve how we serve our partners and clients, ” said Ken O’Malley, president of aeSolutions. “ We have been working to get the right leadership in place, leadership that embraces our core values and our company’s vision as the path for sustainable growth and success. We have it all in place now: the leadership, the culture, and the systems. Our clients are counting on us to help guide them into an uncertain future, and we are ready. ‘Let’s Go!’ is our call for 2024. ”   Company Growth In a year when many process manufacturing companies were struggling with lower demand in the housing and automotive industries, aeSolutions was able to grow its business by 10%. Specifically, the company’s safety system s  ,  fired equipment system s , and its alarm management services  all experienced impressive growth rates in 2023. aeSolutions expects these businesses to continue to demonstrate strong momentum in 2024.   New Markets Minerals processing, especially for the electric vehicle (EV) battery industry, and hydrogen manufacturing continue to be exciting growth areas for the company.   Key Personnel Appointments David Ivester, senior vice president of Sales and Marketing: Ivester’s 30-plus years of experience prior to joining aeSolutions comprised a variety of leadership positions in sales and marketing in the process automation space. As part of its ongoing commitment to employee recruitment and development, in the second quarter of 2024, the company will be announcing additional exciting changes that will bring a balanced focus on client success and the development of our people. Key Product/Deliverable Highlights aeSolutions’ newest product, aeRemoteConnect (aeRC™) , allows engineers to securely and remotely connect to on-site automation systems, reducing response times when troubleshooting or when modifications are urgently needed. The connection can be used by credentialed aeSolutions and client personnel. A secure, end-to-end encrypted tunnel is established via cellular or existing on-site network and key-switch authorization from on-site staff.   aeRC™ provides robust security controls that meet the high security bar set by today’s IT professionals:   • Certificate-based VPN tunnel • Multi-Factor Authentication • Role-based access control • Account auditing • System logging • SOC 2 compliant data center.   With aeRC™, aeSolutions provides a complete solution with all the necessary equipment, licenses, and services. Based on Siemens' SINEMA Remote Connect software and proven industrial networking equipment, this solution is ready for use with any control system platform.   Company Culture/Initiatives In 2023, aeSolutions rolled out its Employee Potential Model, a framework designed to channel and guide employee growth and development. As the company’s plans for 2024 include continued investment in hiring staff, the Employee Potential Model will help new team members quickly learn the skills necessary to help clients be successful, while simultaneously providing real career-enhancing development opportunities. aeSolutions is hiring across all departments, and encourages candidates with automation , process safety, or safety systems experience who are passionate about pursuing their full potential to contact the company’s director of Human Resources, Ben Krisher.   Additionally, the company established a new office in Houston’s Energy Corridor. The relocation is part of the company’s aggressive  strategic growth plans and will serve as a hub for its operations in the Gulf Coast region.   The new office will provide localized client support and offers an ideal location for aeSolutions to engage with a wide range of markets, including traditional and alternative energy sectors, agribusiness, metals, chemicals, and petrochemicals. Plans for 2024 aeSolutions strives to improve industry by guiding clients to increasingly resilient operations and safer communities and thrive delivering products and services to critical applications that others avoid by remaining authentic to its core values. Throughout 2024, aeSolutions will continue to focus on the development of its workforce and the realization of employee potential through the achievement of client success.   About aeSolutions In business since 1998, aeSolutions is a consulting, engineering and systems integration company that provides industrial process safety and automation products and services. They specialize in helping industrial clients achieve their risk management and operational excellence goals through expertise in process safety, combustion control and safeguarding, safety instrumented systems, control system design and integration, alarm management, and related operations and integrity management systems. For more information, visit www.aesolutions.com .   Media Contact RedIron Public Relations for aeSolutions Kari@redironpr.com

December 31st, 2024 — At aeSolutions, our commitment to corporate responsibility goes beyond business as usual. As outlined in our Corporate Responsibility policy , we strive to support our team members, their families, our clients, and the communities where we live and work. In 2024, we amplified this commitment through an enhanced charitable giving initiative, focusing on projects that deliver measurable and sustainable improvements in the areas we serve. Investing in Communities with Purpose aeSolutions is proud to direct charitable contributions to four key areas: Hunger Relief, Health and Human Services, Education, and Military Support. By concentrating our efforts in these vital sectors, we aim to create meaningful and lasting change where it matters most and strive to connect with causes that resonate deeply within our communities. Overcoming Challenges, Driving Results This year, our geographically distributed workforce created a real challenge to making this program strategic and inclusive, but the ingenuity and passion of our employees turned that challenge into an opportunity. We leveraged employee input to shape our giving strategy throughout the year, and our workforce's diverse perspectives allowed us to identify and support causes that reflect the values of our team and the needs of our communities. As Ken O’Malley, CEO, expressed, “ I am so proud of our employees whose compassion brought to life a giving strategy that is meaningful to them .” Contributions That Count Here are just a few highlights of the organizations and initiatives we proudly supported this year: ·         Matching Donation Campaign: We matched employee donations to the American Cancer Society, doubling the impact of our team's generosity in the fight against cancer. ·         Educational Advancement: Contributions to the Society for Women Engineers and sponsorship of the Alaska Science Fair underscore our commitment to fostering STEM education and empowering future leaders. ·         Hunger Relief and Health Services: We continued our longstanding support for the United Way Hands-On-Greenville (HOG) Day, and the Greenville, SC Meals-on-Wheels program, ensuring vital resources reach those in need. In addition to monetary support, several team members in Greenville volunteer their time on a weekly basis to deliver hot meals for community members. ·         Broad Reach: In addition to these key efforts, we supported numerous health and human services organizations across the country, as recommended by our employees, strengthening the safety net for vulnerable populations. Wyatt Smith heading out to deliver Meals on Wheels Looking Ahead Our charitable giving initiative reflects the heart of our company culture — a shared dedication to making a difference. As Joel Read, CFO, noted: “ Our team members exceeded expectations with their support and enthusiasm for our 2024 charitable giving program, and it has been hugely rewarding to have such a positive impact driven by our core values .” By investing in community projects that yield measurable outcomes, we are not just giving back; we are building a foundation for sustainable progress. Together, with our team members, clients, and community partners, we look forward to continuing this important work in the years to come. Christi and Steve Morrison participating in Hands-On Greenville

December 2024 - Learn about six hidden pitfalls that undermine workplace safety culture and learn actionable strategies to foster a more resilient and safety-conscious environment. This article explores the following topics and more: Click here to read the full article on IEN.com Applicability of Process Safety Management (PSM) and Risk Management Program (RMP) Regulations : Many facilities neglect to assess whether these regulations apply to their operations, leading to unstructured safety processes. Mechanical Integrity : While fixed equipment like vessels and piping are usually well-managed, issues frequently arise with rotating equipment and control systems due to inadequate monitoring and maintenance. Management of Change (MOC) : Organizations often fail to implement robust MOC procedures, resulting in unassessed risks when changes occur in processes or equipment. Operating Procedures : Outdated or poorly documented operating procedures can lead to unsafe practices and increased risk of incidents. Training and Competency : Insufficient training programs contribute to a workforce that is ill-prepared to handle safety challenges effectively. Incident Investigation : A lack of thorough incident investigations prevents organizations from learning from past mistakes and implementing corrective actions. by Judith Lesslie, CFSE, CSP, CCPSC , Senior Principal Specialist at aeSolutions . Read the full article here: Safety Culture: Examining Common Shortcomings - IEN.com

December 2024 - Discover how unplanned shutdowns can unlock hidden opportunities to enhance safety testing, optimize maintenance schedules, and improve operational reliability. This article explores the following topics: Click here to read the full article on OHSonline.com Using unplanned shutdowns as partial proof tests for safety systems Identifying which safety components can be effectively tested during shutdowns Understanding the limitations and risks of relying solely on shutdown events for validation Integrating unplanned shutdown insights into regular safety testing protocols Balancing operational safety with extended maintenance intervals by Chris Powell, PE, CFSE , SIS Group Manager at aeSolutions . Read the full article here: Unplanned Shutdowns as Proof Test Credits: What to Know and Steps to Take - OHSonline.com

Presented by Greg Hardin - Senior Principal Specialist, aeSolutions Why Do Control Systems Go Wrong? The British HSE publication “Out of control - Why control systems go wrong and how to prevent failure” (HSE238) reports the primary cause by phase (specification, design and implementation, installation and commissioning, operation and maintenance, changes after commissioning) of failures of 34 safety systems in different industries. This document is frequently referred to in functional safety activities in the process industries. This presentation will consider just how applicable are the quantitative results presented in HSE238 to the process industries. Keywords: automation, systems integration, upgrade, process safety, process control network, pcn, safety instrumented systems, SIS, systematic failure Auto Generated Transcript: Is that really why control systems go wrong? OK. Out of control, why control systems go wrong and how to prevent failure? That's a publication of the United Kingdom's Health and Safety executive. It is, you know, very well down in the functional safety. Business and I have used this chart. In multiple presentations over the years and what it represents is the percent of particular phase of the lifecycle where things went wrong that resulted in eventually in a serious incident. 6% installation and commissioning 20% modifications after commissioning. 15% operation and maintenance. 15% design and implementation and this is the biggie. That was a surprise to a lot of people when it was published. That the idea that where we were going wrong with. Process safety in related to instrumented protective functions was in specification. So if you take that pie chart, you can do the same thing against. Their safety lifecycle. Specification design and implementation. And then you can break it down a little bit more to show the areas that we're interested in. You know hazard and risk analysis, then sift selection safety instrumented function and safety integrity level determination. Thus Isfel is what we. Used to and still do called the calls. Call the group that I am in. And then device selection safety, integrity, integrity level calculation again. That's assist file function. And then not to cut off half the life cycle. Installation and commissioning. Operation and maintenance modification. I think if you had taken a survey of people before the HSE publication came out, this is where people would have said most of the. Incidents were caused and I'll have a little bit more about that to say about that later in the talk. What really prompted me to want to do the some of the research that led to this talk was what is known as the streetlight of effect. You may be familiar with this little story of someone on their hands and knees. Obviously looking for something along comes a police officer. Ask the person what are they doing and they say they're looking for the car keys that they drop well. The officer wants to help, so he asks where were you standing exactly when you dropped them? And the person replies back up the street. Then why are you looking here? Because the light is better. Are we looking at just at the specification to the exclude, not to the exclusion, but, More giving it more effort than we should, because that's, you know, that's our business. That's what's right, and at least you know my part of the business. That's right, what's right in front of me on my desk or on my computer screen? Is the the sisvel portions of the safety lifecycle that I did just identified? So that's the street light effect? When I was putting this talk together, I said, well, I'm familiar with the Identification of the different incidents in the report. Where they identified that specification is where they went wrong. But I said, well, I probably ought to go ahead and really read the report. And if I read the report. The report is not as exclusive. To the analysis of the various phases as. I was assuming they do say that. Poor hazard analysis of the equipment under control. Inadequate assessment. Systematic approach not used. These are all portions of the specification phase. That when you lump everything together as specification, that's where I started to get worried. If we were. If we were looking where the light was better. So this is the table from that report and. Where they picked up 44 of the incidents that they reviewed were 44% were due to inadequate specification and they said of those twelve were inadequate functional requirements. Specification in and 32 were, 32% were. Inadequate safety integrity requirements specification. Well, if you look at all of the incidents in the report, only one third of the total number of incidents. Which was 15 of the incidents in this case total number only one third of those, or approximately 5 are related to incidents in the chemical or refinery industries. So do the causes of incidents in the process industries follow the distribution given in out of control? That was my promise in starting this. There are lots of Compilations of incidents in the process industries. And there's I will give a list of references at the end of this presentation. But. The granularity of the causes in these compilations is somewhat limited, in other words. Just because a significant incident happened very few cases do the reports, particularly the summary reports that you can find on multiple incidents. Rarely do they give you the detail that you would new need to say. Was this specification related or not? Most of the major incidents, involve a sequence of events they have multiple causes related to organizations and other things and. You know they generate these large reports and again you may find something that says, well, specification of this control or safety function was inadequate. That's almost never the entire story. So I did go through and this is, you know, several of the reference lists, and I did look at 50 incidents in a particular period of time out of this out of loss prevention and the process industries, which is a commonly cited book and I was only able to identify five that were in the least bit instrument related. Based on the description that was given and again. You know, can you say from this was these were these specification related? Possibly there just not enough detail to to tell, so my initial premise that I could. Review the incidents and Compare the results that I could get to the same distribution of incidence of causes in the HSE publication. Turned out to not be very practical, but what can we talk about? Well, here are some of the better known major incidents. I think everybody's probably heard most about most of these, of course, Pasadena in 1989 was the explosion at the Phillips 66 facility here in the Houston area that resulted in the death of Mary Kay O'Connor and eventually the founding of the Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center. The one incident of all of these where you could say that Specifications sure sounds like specification was a good portion of the problem. Was bunch field, but essentially it was a tank overflowed in a fuel depot outside of London and generated and explode a vapor cloud that eventually exploded. And reading the reports on the incident, if you look at it, it's like boy. If this was the consequence Well, did they not recognize the potential consequences of overfilling a tank? Would it have not made sense to have multiple, independent, diverse technology level instruments and communication to the remote Control Center? You know, so I would have to say of the major incidents. That most people are familiar with Bunch Field becomes the closest to being specification related. So where can things go wrong in specifications? Well, you know. Obviously in the hazards assessment. If you don't identify a hazard if you don't identify an initiating event, if you don't accurately. Predict the potential consequences if you give too much credit for your existing safeguards. Well then you regarding ill then you have missed something that will not be addressed in the rest of your project. Risk assessment. People tend to overestimate or underestimate initiating event frequency. We happen to be of all involved in a a project right now. I did some checking on just the other day where we're actually doing some failure mode and effect analysis. Trying to apply some Bayesian statistics to help a client identify the closer. Initiating event frequency to the true value than what you can get just out of looking at the reference books. Obviously you can over under May underestimate the consequence, severity, conditional modifiers and enabling conditions of inappropriately applied to reduce the potential frequency. I've borrowed this chart from the presentation I did a while back on functional safety assessments and this is just. You know, I put this together, it's it's not really a serious analysis. But one thing we run and run into frequently when people ask us to help them do. Safety, integrity level, determination of safety functions related to fired equipment is that they start out assuming that if the slightest bit of uncombusted fuel makes its way into the fire box, then you have a violent explosion that results in a fatality. And if you look at it, it's. Yeah, that makes an awful lot of assumptions, so this just happens to be a specific instance that I've seen several times and people come up with outrageous what seems unnecessarily high. Safety, integrity level requirements beyond that required by the standards. To address this, when if they took a, a more hardheaded look at it, it would not necessarily occur with the frequency or the consequence that they assume. In the safety requirements specification. Systematic errors or your field device is going to be certified to E. C, Six, 1508 or based on prior use. The standard is more forgiving of you if you base them on prior use. However, this is also some place where you can go wrong or go astray, I should say. Because the latest version of ANSI ISA 615 eleven allows you to have a safety integrity level, two function with zero hardware fault tolerance. In other words, no redundancy. Well, that is based on the fact that the failure rates you're using to calculate the safety integrity level are based on prior use, but the standard doesn't stay that very clearly an you know. That's an unfortunate. Weakness I think in the standard, but it's a place where you have to be careful. It makes a difference in how you evaluate hardware, fault tolerance, architectural constraints. Whether you're basing your failure rates. Are they certified devices or are they based on prior use? Is your failure rate data reasonable? Boy, that's something that we deal with very frequently. Clients will come to us sometimes with a manufacturer certificate that has a. Dangerous undetected failure rate for a device that's one or two orders of magnitude lower than what we're used to seeing even for certified devices. And sometimes it can be difficult to get the client to recognize the risk that they're taking in the past. Sometimes I have performed the calculation with their data and then with more reasonable data and showed them the difference. And like I say, you're trying to identify the risk. That the client is assuming by using this potentially unreasonable failure rate that the device can't really maintain in the field. Test intervals. Are people really thought through? You know, that's one of the knobs that they want us to change. Is test intervals? Well, yeah, I can't see you know. Well, let's make this the test interval shorter and we'll get the safety integrity level down. Well yeah, that's true. Or mean up increases. Excuse me, but is that really? You know, if you've got a five year turn around frequency and that's the only time that you can test some of your safety functions well. D. I'll just changing the number. Doesn't really do you anything if you can't actually operate that way. Test coverage is. That's another place where people want to say oh, our test coverage. We're night. We cover 99% of the potential failures. Well, if you look at the possible, hopefully the manufacturers safety manual, that's possibly not. Reasonable, we had a good presentation to spend some time ago about vendor talking about the work that has been done in the nuclear industry about what it takes to obtain test, you know, proof test coverage for shut off valves, and they're not even to get to the highest. Proof test coverage takes an awful lot of work and an awful lot of resources. Hardware resources. Process safety time. Is it accurate digit? Is it considered in the design to the valves really closed fast enough? All process operating modes consider. Do you consider startup and shutdown? Are there times when one piece of equipment is out of service but not another will tripping this safety function at that time? Create a hazard you hadn't anticipated. So in summary. Are 44% of the incidents in the process industries do just to a specification error of a safety function? Doubtful. Most have complex causes noticed. I'm saying serious incidents. Out of control, focused attention on the specification portion of the safety lifecycle, and that was a good thing because before that I think most people would have said that operation and maintenance and problems with management of change where where the main causes of serious incidents were happening and when reason for that is. Well, you know things don't blow up during the Specification's age. They have to be operating and being maintained before you have a serious incident, and so that's tends to be where the focus is. That doesn't mean that the chain that led to the incident did not start back in the specification phase. So out of control, I still consider it a valuable reference.

Updated November 2024 — Written by Judith Lesslie, CFSE, CSP — Those who work in high hazard industries are familiar with the OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) and EPA Risk Management Plan (RMP) requirements for routine audits to assess and verify compliance with these regulations. In Part 1 blog, we reviewed specific types of concerns that have been identified at many manufacturing sites for several of the PSM/RMP elements. In Part 2 we review the following elements: MOC/PSSR, Process Safety Information, Operating Procedures, Mechanical Integrity, Process Hazard Analysis, and Training. This blog is Part 2 of a series. If you missed part 1, you can find it here.   Reviewing Key PSM/RMP Elements for Compliance: MOC/PSSR, Process Safety Information, and More Management of Change (MOC) and Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR) Management of Change (MOC)  and Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR) are two elements that are joined at the hip. Almost all sites have occasional one-off failings in their MOC and PSSR systems, but very common program-level failures occur around failure to conduct adequate PSSRs prior to approval for startup; failure to follow-up or document punch list items from PSSRs; and failure to conduct or document adequate training or informing of affected personnel prior to startup. While organizational changes are not specifically required to be included in a site’s MOC system, organizational change management is considered RAGAGEP for PSM facilities, so it behooves covered sites to ensure that changes to personnel and changes to the organizational structure are managed appropriately. Process Safety Information (PSI) Like MOC and PSSR, most sites have occasional failings in the Process Safety Information (PSI) element, which describes information pertaining to the HHC that is required to be available. Larger gaps of PSI are present more often than you might think, including such areas as a clear electrical area classification map, basic process control system alarm documentation (including those identified in process hazard analyses), poor instrumentation documentation, failure to identify safety upper and lower operating limits and the consequences of deviations from those limits, failure to ensure that the process safety time available for Operator response to alarm safeguards (as identified in PHAs) is adequate. Ventilation system design information is another area where documentation is frequently lacking as well. Operating Procedure Operating Procedure element failures often echo the PSI failures mentioned above, most particularly in the areas of identification of safety upper and lower operating limits, the consequences of deviations from those limits, and the steps required to correct or avoid deviations. In a similar vein, safety systems and their functions are sometimes not well-covered in operating procedures. It is also relatively common to identify procedures that do not explicitly cover operating phases, such as startup, shutdown, temporary or emergency operations. Finally, a surprising number of facilities fail to annually certify that operating procedures are current and accurate. Mechanical Integrity Mechanical Integrity (MI) is a huge element, covering vessels, tanks, piping systems, relief devices, emergency shutdown systems, controls, and rotating equipment. While MI programs for mechanical equipment are typically better developed than those for instrumentation and control systems, there are still relatively common concerns identified for mechanical equipment. These include non-code-compliant inspection reports, failure to use appropriately certified inspection personnel, and failure to include components such as hoses, expansion joints, check valves, or other less common mechanical components in the program when they are critical to covered processes. Mechanical Integrity program concerns with controls (including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms, and interlocks) and emergency stop functions are even more common. These include failures to categorize criticality, failure to test or inspect (including very serious failures to test process safety e-stops, instruments, and interlocks), and failure to align process hazard analysis (PHA) safeguards with the equipment included in the Mechanical Integrity program. Process Hazard Analysis A Process Hazard Analysis an area where quality varies widely across facilities. While most sites do have PHA reports, it is far too common to find covered process PHAs that are of poor quality, that use non-standard practices, and that are neglected once completed. PHAs are overdue more frequently than you might anticipate as well. There are many sources of good PHA practices and initiating cause data. It behooves facilities to ensure that the personnel responsible for executing the PHA program are well-trained in current industry practices and have good software tools for executing PHAs. It is also important that PHA recommendations and actions to ensure the integrity of identified safeguards are a part of the program expectations. Related to this, PHA recommendations should receive a high level of management attention to ensure they are completed to expectations in a timely manner. Training The Training element is one of those typically in pretty good shape at many facilities. However, it is not uncommon to find that employees involved in operating the process are not involved in determining the appropriate frequency for refresher training. The Stakes The PSM and RMP regulations have proven over time that they are excellent practices to drive the reduction of serious process safety incidents. It is far better for a company and sites to find and correct their own PSM and RMP system deficiencies than for a serious incident to occur or for a regulatory agency to identify it. Are you positive that the commonly found concerns reviewed above are not present at your facility? Leveraging Expert Support for Comprehensive PSM/RMP Compliance Assessments If you have not previously taken a deep dive into the assessment of the topics above at your site, now would be a good time to do so. If you do not have the right expertise in your staff to assess PSM and RMP compliance in these areas, consider selecting a process safety consultancy with deep experience and expertise to assist you . Their range of experience enables external auditors to share the general methods proven to drive good PSM and RMP compliance across industry. This independence from the site and company has the best probability of a careful assessment with fresh eyes on the relevant critical systems and leads to more efficient compliance with the necessary standards.

Updated November 2024 — Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) has become an i mportant tool used in industry, often in conjunction with a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) . It is used to evaluate high severity or high risk consequences with additional rigor of review to assess that safeguards and systems are adequately in place to meet the company’s risk tolerance requirements. During a LOPA, safeguards are identified to interrupt an initiating event from progressing to an undesired consequence. These safeguards must meet the following five core attributes to be credited in a LOPA for risk reduction and classified as Independent Protection Layers (IPLs). Independence Independence is used to assure the effects of the initiating event, or of other IPLs, do not interact with a specific IPL and thereby degrade its ability to perform its function. Independence requires that an IPL’s effectiveness is independent of; The occurrence, or consequences, of the initiating event; and The failure of any component of an IPL already credited for the same scenario. Dependability Dependability is used to assure the IPL is available when needed to prevent the hazard scenario from occurring. Protection provided by the IPL shall reduce the identified risk by at least ten-fold. Specificity Specificity is used to verify the IPL can prevent the cause from progressing to the undesired consequence. Auditability Auditability is used to verify the IPL is routinely tested/inspected at an adequate frequency through the process lifecycle to maintain its dependability. An IPL component, system or action shall be auditable to demonstrate that it meets the risk mitigation requirements of a LOPA IPL. The auditing process shall confirm effectiveness of the IPL through review of the design, installation, functional testing, and maintenance systems of the IPL. Security Security is used to verify the IPL has controls in place that prevent unauthorized changes. The IPL shall be managed by design or by administrative procedure to ensure unauthorized changes are not made that affect the integrity of the IPL, its availability, or any of its properties. Typically during a LOPA, the team does not have the time or resources to assess each IPL to verify they meet these requirements. IPL validation is a process to examine the key elements that qualifies a safeguard as an IPL to ensure they will function when needed and prevent propagation of a hazardous scenario. Good industry practice is to manage, test, and document IPLs through the lifecycle of the process. IPL validation is based on guidelines established under the International Society of Automation ISA-84.91.01 and OSHA Process Safety Management , 29 CFR 1910.119. It is important to note that validation of Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) IPLs are specifically managed under requirements for ISA 84.00.01 and not part of this validation. IPL validation typically uses a set of questions to evaluate if a safeguard meets the five core attributes of an IPL. At aeSolutions, we approach IPL validation using checklists with specific questions for each type of IPL (e.g. alarm, check valve, dike, procedure, etc.). Our associates work closely with each site to gather and review the necessary data to complete the checklists. If an affirmative answer to a question cannot be proven with site documentation, the item is listed as a gap and recommendations are generated. The recommendations are communicated to the facility for further action. Through our work on various IPL validation projects, it has often surprised facilities to discover the areas IPLs do not meet validation criteria. LOPA Teams make every effort to use up-to-date process safety information. They use P&IDs to identify available safeguards, such as relief or indicating devices, however during the IPL validation process discover that the device has been removed, modified or is not functioning properly. Further investigation would be recommended to resolve the risk and evaluate the potential gaps in process safety information, the management of change process, etc. Another example is when a BPCS related IPL (alarm or software action) is identified as being on the same Input/output (I/O) card as another credited IPL or the initiating event device. Typically, the LOPA team does not have the ability, due to time or resource constraints, to review automation logic diagrams during their meeting. So unless a LOPA team member is reviewing the automation logic diagrams this common cause would never be found. The team would feel confident the risk of the hazard scenario is sufficiently mitigated, when in actuality it is not. However, during the IPL validation, review of the I/O card would reveal the lack of independence and require either the selection of a new IPL or a modification to the I/O card arrangement. These examples show that while the LOPA team may identify IPLs to sufficiently manage the risk of the hazard, more evaluation is needed to verify these IPLs as existing or to identify deficiencies. Corrective actions from IPL validation can range from adding IPLs to the site’s mechanical integrity program to revisiting the LOPA and selecting a more reliable IPL. IPL validation is a good industry practice to verify that your IPLs are properly managed, tested, and documented. The IPL validation checklists are also a great reference for future PHA and LOPA studies. #ISA #LOPA #pha #SafetyInstrumentedFunction Learn More About aeSolutions Process Safety

Functional Safety & Bayesian Networks Functional safety engineers fol low the ISA/IEC 61511 standard & perform calculations based on random hardware failures. These result in low failure probabilities, which are then combined with similarly low failure probabilities for other safety layers, to show that the overall probability of an accident is extremely low (e.g., 1E-5/yr). Unfortunately, such numbers are based on frequentist assumptions and cannot be proven. Looking at actual accidents caused by control and safety system failures shows that accidents are not caused by random hardware failures. Accidents are typically the result of steady and slow normalization of deviation (a.k.a. drift). It’s up to management to control these factors. However, Bayes theorem can be used to update our prior belief (the initial calculated failure probability) based on observing other evidence (e.g., the effectiveness of the facility’s process safety management process). The results can be dramatic. For example, ass uming a safety instrumented function w ith a risk reduction factor of 5,000 (i.e., SIL 3 performance), and a process safety management program with a 99% effectiveness, results in the function actually having a risk reduction factor of just 98 (i.e., essentially the borderline between SIL1 and SIL 2). The key takeaway is that the focus of functional safety should be on effectively following all the steps in the ISA/IEC 61511 safety lifecycle and the requirements of the OSHA PSM regulation, not the math or certification of devices. Both documents were essentially written in blood through lessons learned the hard way by many organizations. To learn more about the use of Bayesian networks in functional safety , read the full paper here.

Functional safety engineers follow the ISA/IEC 61511 standard and perform calculations based on random hardware failures. These result in very low failure probabilities, which are then combined with similarly low failure probabilities for other safety layers, to show that the overall probability of an accident is extremely low (e.g., 1E-5/yr). Unfortunately, such numbers are based on frequentist assumptions and cannot be proven. Looking at actual accidents caused by control and safety system failures shows that accidents are not caused by random hardware failures. Accidents are typically the result of steady and slow normalization of deviation (a.k.a. drift). It’s up to management to control these factors. However, Bayes theorem can be used to update our prior belief (the initial calculated failure probability) based on observing other evidence (e.g., the effectiveness of the facility’s process safety management process). The results can be dramatic. Unlock this download by completing the following form:

Everyone wants to provide a safe atmosphere for workers, facilities and the surrounding environment. The greatest risk in many process facilities comes from fired equipment. Burner management systems (BMSs) are the safety instrumented systems specific to fired equipment. The greatest challenge many asset owners face while evaluating the adequacy of their existing BMS designs comes from the inconsistency of results from one type of fired device to another of the same type (e.g., a heater or boiler) when using a risk assessment technique such as hazard and operability study (HAZOP ) or layer of protection analysis (LOPA) . Findings an d recommendations should be similar for similar installations. The largest contributors of inconsistency are the qualitative nature of the techniques and the strong opinions of the team members. This is even more of a challenge when different teams are used in different risk assessments. However, there are ways to introduce consistency to the studies without turning them into detailed and expensive quantitative risk assessments. The Environmental Protection Agency has developed simplified protocols for risk management planning to help with this. These protocols utilize equivalent TNT methodologies as contained in the Federal Emergency Management Agency “Handbook of Chemical Analysis Procedures”. Use of this resource can provide the empirical basis needed to drive consistency in the assessment of fired equipment from one asset to another, one facility to another, and one risk assessment team to another. This technique can be simplified in a seven-step method to yield consistent results for fired equipment. These can be summarized as: Step 1: Calculate the vapor cloud explosion effect zone of the fired equipment. Step 2: Calculate the physical explosion and deflagration effect zone. Step 3: Calculate the pool fire effect zone (for liquid fuels only). Step 4: Calculate the personnel density in the effect zone and determine extent of impact. Step 5: Perform a LOPA to determine the frequency for each hazardous event. Step 6: Determine the required probability of failure on demand (PFD) for each safety instrumented function (SIF). Step 7: Determine the required safety integrity level (SIL) for each SIF. Any SIL selection method adopted by a company needs to be easy to use and yield quick results. To make the seven-step method described above easier to utilize, it is recommended that companies develop the following set of tools and procedures: A spreadsheet application for each type of the most common types of fuels the company utilizes in their fired equipment to calculate each of the three effect zones A supporting procedure on calculation of personnel densities A spreadsheet application that provides a framework for LOPA for each of the standard SIFs in BMSs A supporting procedure to include guidance on how to perform LOPA A cost / benefit analysis spreadsheet to support project justification Adopting this methodology will allow a company to quickly, efficiently and consistently evaluate their BMSs and make the most cost-effective business decisions. For more details on how to make the right selections, read the paper “ Burner Management System Safety Integrity Level Selection .”

Updated November 2024 — Authored by Carolyn Bott — A Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) will prove to be the cornerstone of Process Safety Management (PSM) at any operating facility with the correct tools and the right leaders. Although there are many variables concerning PHAs, the process can be simplified and impactful results can be attained. In this blog, we delve into the 5 facets of an efficient process hazard analysis (PHA). Process Hazard Analysis Scope A well-defined scope for a Process Hazard Analysis is critical to identify potential safety and environmental hazards in a facility. Having a clear and defined Process Hazard Analysis scope does the following: Sets the boundaries of the analysis - This assures all necessary elements are included and relevant risks are identified and assessed Enables the Process Hazard Analysis team to focus on specific areas of concern and analyze them in detail - This reduces the potential for error and minimizes both the time and resources needed Ensures that all stakeholders are aware of the objectives and outcomes of the PHA Standard for Approaching a Process Hazard Analysis Different companies may have their own specific Process Hazard Analysis standards, specific to their operations and the risks involved. These standards typically outline essential measures to perform a thorough PHA, including: Qualifications and training required for team members Selection of appropriate methodologies Level of detail required in the analysis Documentation requirements for the study Frequency of review Ongoing monitoring requirements ensuring the safety and efficiency of operating processes Adherence to these standards is typically required by regulatory bodies and industry best practices. A standard can ensure all relevant factors are considered and a thorough analysis is conducted. Following a standard also facilitates communication and collaboration among stakeholders, enhances consistent decision-making across sites, and promotes continuous improvement in a site’s process safety. Process Hazard Analysis Team An effective Process Hazard Analysis team is composed of individuals with diverse expertise, including engineers, operators, maintenance personnel, and safety professionals. The team: Shall have expertise in engineering and process operations Shall include at least one employee who has experience and knowledge specific to the process being evaluated One member of the team must be knowledgeable in the specific process hazard analysis methodology being used Must be able to work collaboratively to identify hazards, evaluate risks, and develop appropriate risk management strategies Effective communication and teamwork are vital for a successful and efficient PHA. The proficiency of the PHA leader or facilitator has a substantial impact on the team and the outcome of the PHA. A facilitator leans on their own risk management experience and is responsible for guiding the team through the identification and evaluation of all credible process hazards. The leader continuously assesses the team’s dynamic and intervenes when necessary to ensure the group remains on task to complete the PHA efficiently with impactful results. A company can utilize in house experts or hire a third-party to shepherd their Process Hazard Analysis needs – Process Safety Consulting Process Hazard Analysis Techniques & Tools Methodologies The methodology selected must be appropriate to the complexity of the process and site standards. One or more of the following methods, as appropriate, may be used to determine and evaluate the hazards of the process being analyzed: What-if Checklist What-if Checklist Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) Fault tree analysis An appropriate equivalent methodology For more info on choosing a risk assessment methodology, check out our webinar that examines the advantages and limitations of various methodologies: Choosing a Risk Assessment Methodology Tools Computer-based systems are used to document Process Hazard Analysis discussions in an organized manner and provide consistency throughout the analysis. Examples of PHA documenting software include: Sphera® PHA-Pro® PrimaTech PHAWORKS RA® aeShield® aeFacilitator® Using appropriate software eases the execution of risk studies. Process Hazard Analysis Review Cycle All Process Hazard Analyses must be updated and revalidated every five years. The periodic review should reflect any changes in the process or surrounding environment that may impact safety. An alternate approach to managing PHA updates is to incorporate them into the study file as changes occur. This method is often called an Evergreen PHA or Continuous PHA Revalidation. An efficient and effective PHA can enhance the safety of processes, reduce the risk of accidents and incidents, improve compliance with regulations and standards, and ultimately support the organization's goals and objectives. Ensuring these five (5) components are in place can help companies have an efficient PHA to identify and mitigate risks before they become safety incidents. The Takeaway | 5 Facets of an Efficient Process Hazard Analysis Summarized Clear and well-defined scope that is relevant to the system being analyzed Systematic and structured approach Multi-disciplinary team of subject matter experts who can identify and evaluate potential hazards from different perspectives Use of appropriate techniques and tools to evaluate and prioritize risks Periodic reviews and updates If you need more guidance for your Process Hazard Analysis, please feel free to reach out to aeSolutions to speak with one of our PHA experts about our capabilities.

October 2024 - Imagine discovering a critical flaw in your safety system design before your plant goes operational. This scenario, while nerve-wracking, underscores the importance of early intervention in the design phase. This article explores the following topics: How FSA Stage 1 can discover critical flaws early How FSA Stage 1 can reduce incidents The process steps for FSA Stage 1 How FSA Stage 1 can help prevent costly fixes How FSA Stage 1 can help prevent unknown renewable energy risks by Chris Powell, PE, CFSE , SIS Group Manager at aeSolutions . Read the full article here: Functional Safety Assessment Stage 1 can Discover Critical Flaws Early (ISSSource.com)